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Litigating Data Sovereignty 
abstract.  Because the internet is so thoroughly global, nearly every aspect of internet gov-
ernance has an extraterritorial effect. This is evident in a number of high-proﬁle cases that cover a 
wide range of subjects, including law enforcement access to digital evidence; speech disputes, such 
as requests to remove offensive or hateful web content; intellectual property disputes; and much 
more. Although substantively distinct, these issues present courts with the same jurisdictional 
challenge: how to ensure one state’s sovereign interest in regulating the internet’s local effects 
without infringing on other states’ interests. 
 The answer, for better or for worse, is comity, the foreign affairs principle that informs a num-
ber of sovereign-deference doctrines. Sovereignty arguments have pervaded a number of recent 
consequential cases, including Google’s challenge to the “right to be forgotten” in Europe and 
Microsoft’s challenge to a court order to produce foreign-held emails under the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act. These arguments will continue to play a signiﬁcant role in future cases. 
Yet the proper application of foreign affairs law to cross-border internet disputes is not what many 
litigants and courts have claimed. Crucially, no sovereign-deference doctrine prohibits global 
takedown requests, foreign production orders, or other forms of extraterritorial exercises of juris-
diction over the internet. To the contrary, one of the key lessons of the sovereign-deference juris-
prudence is that in order to avoid tensions between sovereigns, courts often enable, rather than 
inhibit, extraterritorial exercises of authority. 
 This Article has three goals. First, it seeks to identify and characterize an emerging body of 
case law, which we might call data-sovereignty litigation: a diverse set of cases pitting national 
sovereigns against large internet ﬁrms. Second, the Article aims to show how the doctrinal rules 
of sovereign deference ought to apply to these disputes. Finally, it makes the case for a policy of 
sovereign deference beyond courts. The stakes are considerable. If we do not ﬁnd ways to accom-
modate legitimate sovereign claims over global cloud activity, states will forcefully assert those 
interests—typically by taking physical control over local network infrastructure—imposing signif-
icant costs on entrepreneurship, privacy, and speech.  
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introduction 
The key questions of internet global governance—including which nations 
get to determine how internet services operate globally—are being resolved by 
courts. A number of high-stakes cases ask courts to identify foreign sovereign 
interests, weigh them against domestic interests, and defer to foreign sovereigns 
where appropriate.
1
 Consider a few recent examples: 
 
1.  On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court heard oral ar-
gument in Microsoft’s long-running dispute with the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) over the territorial reach of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act (ECPA).
2
 In its petition for certiorari, the DOJ asked 
the Court to overturn the Second Circuit’s ruling that ECPA does not 
apply extraterritorially—a ruling that prevented American law enforce-
ment from compelling technology companies to produce emails stored 
on foreign datacenters.
3
 The petitioner urged the Court to allow ECPA’s 
production orders to compel the production of foreign-held emails,
4
 a 
view that Microsoft argued would be an incursion upon Irish sover-
eignty.
5




2.  On July 27, 2017, Google asked the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California for declaratory relief from a Canadian court order 
that required Google to remove certain websites from its search results. 
The order sought to change Google’s search results not just in Canada 
but also globally.
7
 The issue, Google said, is one of “international com-
ity”
8
 because the “Canadian Order purports to place the Canadian court 
 
1. These disputes ask courts to answer Lawrence Lessig’s old but still unresolved question: 
“[W]hat kinds of claims should one sovereign be able to make on others, and what kinds of 
claims can these sovereigns make on cyberspace?” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 302 (2d ed. 2006). 
2. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam). 
3. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
4. Id. at 21-25. 
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
6. Id. at 60. 
7. Complaint at 2, Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., No. 5:17-cv-04207-NC (N.D. Cal. July 24, 
2017). 
8. Id. at 3. 
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in the position of supervising the law enforcement activities of a foreign 
sovereign nation (the United States).”
9
 
3.  On July 19, 2017, France’s top administrative court, the Conseil d’État, 
referred a case to the European Court of Justice for the European Union 
regarding Google’s refusal to comply with an order that the ﬁrm apply 
its right-to-be-forgotten regime not only within Europe, but world-
wide.
10
 Google stated that it is ﬁghting the order because “one country 





Despite their substantive differences, each of these cases presents a court 
with a similar set of jurisdictional line-drawing questions. What is the scope of 
sovereign authority over the cloud?
12
 Are extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction 
lawful? How much deference is owed to foreign sovereign interests in regulating 
internet activity? How should courts weigh competing claims of sovereign au-
thority? In other words, each of these disputes implicates the subset of foreign 
affairs law known as comity.
13
 Comity is the principle that courts should recog-
nize and sometimes defer to foreign sovereign interests. This principle has been 
 
9. Id. at 12. Google won a default judgment on the grounds that the Canadian order violates 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Equustek, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206818, at 
*1, *3. 
10. Mark Scott, French Court Refers Google Privacy Case to ECJ, POLITICO (Jan. 28, 2018, 10:12 PM 
CET), https://www.politico.eu/article/french-court-refers-google-privacy-case-to-ecj 
[https://perma.cc/TH2P-GFRN]. 
11. Kent Walker, A Principle that Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.blog.google/topics/google-europe/a-principle-that-should-not-be-forgotten 
[https://perma.cc/D3UY-665Q]. 
12. The Article will refer to the cloud and the internet as interchangeable, since so many of the 
dominant internet services and applications today use a cloud-based model of distributed data 
and software. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COM-
PUTING 2 (2011) (providing the most widely cited deﬁnition of cloud computing); see also Ri-
ley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Cloud computing is the capacity of Internet-
connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself.”). 
This Article refers to data as digital information capable of being uploaded and shared on the 
internet. 
13. As the Supreme Court wrote more than a hundred years ago: 
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial 
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incorporated into American law in a number of different sovereign-deference 
doctrines.
14
 How, then, do these doctrines apply to cross-border internet dis-
putes? 
This Article offers a roadmap for answering this question. Despite the nov-
elty of the underlying technologies involved in these cases, the doctrinal chal-
lenges are not so new. Courts have long resolved cross-border legal controversies 
by applying sovereign-deference principles, and in that regard today’s data sov-
ereignty disputes are no different. A study of these principles reveals that courts 
have a suite of tools at their disposal to manage data sovereignty concerns and in 
so doing craft sensible global internet policy. The Article examines both how 
these sovereign-deference doctrines might apply to data sovereignty disputes
15
 
and how they might not apply.
16
 Contrary to what some have claimed, these 
doctrines anticipate that sovereign interests extend beyond territorial borders.
17
 
In several high-proﬁle internet disputes, large technology ﬁrms and some states 
 
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conven-
ience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws. 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Comity is “a sort of intercourt diplomacy long 
assumed to be within courts’ constitutional competence.” Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Iso-
lationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1096 (2015). 
14. Scholars use the phrase “comity doctrines” and “sovereign-deference doctrines” interchange-
ably, and often as a subset of “foreign relations doctrines” and “international relations doc-
trines.” Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, for example, speak interchangeably about “foreign 
relations law” and “international relations doctrines,” which they divide into “comity doc-
trines” and “anti-comity doctrines.” Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1173-81 (2007). As William Dodge notes, comity is “defer-
ence to foreign government actors that is not required by international law but is incorporated 
in domestic law.” William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071, 2078 (2015) (emphasis omitted). Comity, along with other foreign affairs doctrines, was 
incorporated into American law long ago. See CURTIS BRADLEY & JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW 4 (6th ed. 2017) (“An understanding of history is . . . particularly useful when 
studying foreign relations law. The Constitution was written against the background of, and 
was designed in part to redress, concrete foreign relations problems that arose in the pre-
constitutional period.”). 
15. I focus on American foreign affairs doctrines—not the international legal doctrines—because 
although some of these issues will ﬁrst be litigated in foreign courts, they will ultimately end 
up before an American judge who must decide whether to enforce the foreign judgment 
against the world’s leading internet companies, most of which are American. For a summary 
of the reach of American ﬁrms across the global internet, see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amend-
ment and the Global Internet, 67 STAN. L. REV. 285, 287-88 (2015); and see also Andrew Keane 
Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 741 (2016), which cites evidence 
that the world’s most popular internet services are American. 
16. See infra Part IV. 
17. See id. 
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have argued that sovereignty concerns prohibit extraterritorial exercises of juris-
diction.
18
 However, no principle of sovereign deference per se prohibits global 
injunctions, global takedown requests, or other forms of extraterritorial exercises 
of jurisdiction over the cloud.
19
 Instead, comity principles sometimes call for 
deference to and even enforcement of cross-border legal orders.
20
 Ultimately, the 
Article offers a defense of two controversial positions: (1) that efforts by national 
sovereigns to regulate the internet in ways that have extraterritorial effects are 
inevitable; and (2) that courts are well equipped to manage disputes where con-
ﬂicts arise. 
In earlier work, which focused on law enforcement access to data in other 
jurisdictions, I argued that courts should rely on a relatively simple conﬂicts-of-
laws principle: they should balance competing governments’ interests against 
one another.
21
 This Article builds on that idea by clarifying the meaning of “gov-
ernment interest” in the context of the frequently invoked sovereignty doctrines, 
and by looking beyond the law enforcement context to the cross-border regula-
tion of the internet more generally. 
In doing so, the Article connects two distinct scholarly literatures: scholar-
ship about the regulation of data and scholarship about foreign affairs. Reading 
these literatures together makes good sense today for two reasons. First, scholars 
of data regulation are increasingly concerned with sovereignty, which has long 
been a central focus of foreign affairs scholarship. While sovereignty concerns 
 
18. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 57, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) 
(per curiam) (No. 17-2) (“Such a projection of U.S. law-enforcement power into foreign 
countries would trammel their sovereignty and threaten to disrupt harmony among na-
tions . . . .”); Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft, Inc. by Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 
10-14, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account 
Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-2985-cv) 
(arguing that the case raises novel comity concerns); Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, Microsoft, 
829 F.3d 197 (No. 14-2985-cv) (relying on arguments of comity and respect for foreign sover-
eignty); Factum of the Intervener the Attorney General of Canada at 3-4, Google Inc. v. 
Equustek Sols. Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.) (No. 36602) (“Applying Canadian law in an-
other state without its consent amounts to the impermissible exercise of extraterritorial en-
forcement jurisdiction, which is precluded by the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention 
and comity.”); Application Record of the Applicant, Google Inc. at 120, Equustek, [2017] 1 
S.C.R. 824 (No. 36602) (arguing that comity counsels against using Canadian courts to “di-
rectly command a person outside of Canada who has committed no civil wrong in Canada to 
do something, or risk being punished for contempt of the Canadian court”). 
19. See infra Part IV. 
20. Id. 
21. Woods, supra note 15, at 776. 
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arose in even the earliest internet scholarship, they have new signiﬁcance today.
22
 
Many of the early internet-jurisdiction cases dealt with relatively simple scenar-
ios—such as when someone in State A posts something online that violates the 
law in State B
23
—that do not match the scale or complexity of, say, the European 
Union regulating speech rules for a two-billion-user platform like Facebook.
24
 
The power dynamics were different then as well. When Yahoo! battled with 
France over a decade ago, in one of the early data sovereignty cases, Yahoo! was 
a relatively small company.
25
 By contrast, today’s data sovereignty disputes pit 
the world’s most valuable companies against nation-states. Indeed, in their ex-
treme form, they pit alliances of powerful companies against alliances of na-
tions.
26
 This new power dynamic is precisely what has caused some scholars to 
worry—wrongly, in my view
27





22. See JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW 51-63 (7th ed. 2017) (describing the early internet-
jurisdiction disputes and noting that all internet issues are at some level jurisdictional). 
23. See id. 
24. See Daniel Boffey, EU Threatens to Crack Down on Facebook over Hate Speech, GUARDIAN (Apr. 
11, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/apr/11/eu-heavy 
-sanctions-online-hate-speech-facebook-scandal [https://perma.cc/6SC9-NEYM]. 
25. Yahoo!’s legal battle with France ended in 2006. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme 
Et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). At the time, the ﬁrm was rapidly losing 
market share to Google. See Fred Vogelstein, How Yahoo Blew It, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2007, 12:00 
PM), https://www.wired.com/2007/02/yahoo-3 [https://perma.cc/5Z7Q-TMDF]. Google 
is valued today at $600 billion, and there is talk that it will soon be worth $1 trillion. Anita 
Balakrishnan, Amazon, Apple, and Alphabet Are in a Race to Become the First Trillion-Dollar Com-
pany - Munster, CNBC (Apr. 21, 2017, 5:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/21 
/gene-munster-the-1-trillion-market-cap-chances-for-amazon-apple-or-google.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2NG-Y7VS]. 
26. For example, the European Union has taken on the social media industry as a whole on a 
number of issues. See infra Section I.A.1. 
27. See infra Section II.A. 
28. See Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179, 182 (2018) (“The multinational 
companies that manage our data have taken on a form of international governance in ways 
that traditional governments can’t and won’t.”); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 
125 YALE L.J. 326, 365 (2015) (describing the longstanding view that the “unilateral exercise of 
law enforcement in another state’s territory is a breach of that state’s sovereignty” and noting 
that “data is beginning to challenge this established understanding”); Kristen E. Eichensehr, 
The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 325 n.30 (2015) (describing the “weakness or ab-
sence [of national sovereignty] in the current cyberspace context”); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Sur-
veillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 187 (2018) (“[I]nternet companies challenge the 
state’s monopoly over security, the very locus of traditional conceptions of sovereignty.”); 
Digital Security and Due Process: Modernizing Cross-Border Surveillance Law for the Cloud Era 
(June 22, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/technology/event/digital-security-and-due 
-process-modernizing-cross-border-surveillance-law-the (describing the rise of cyberspace 
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Second, reading these literatures together reveals a shared concern over in-
stitutional competence. Scholars writing about the regulation of new technolo-
gies have engaged in a decades-long debate about the proper role of courts as 
creators of technology policy.
29
 Some argue that courts should exercise special 
restraint in areas of fast-changing technology policy because they are less well 
suited to developing technology policy than the other branches of government.
30
 
Others disagree, arguing that technology policy is not so exceptional and that 
courts offer certain advantages over the other branches.
31
 This exchange echoes 
similar debates about the role of courts in foreign affairs.
32
 There is a growing 




as “perhaps the most transformative issue since the fall of the Berlin Wall back in the 1980s 
in terms of how it is reordering society,” because unlike nation states, “characterized by bor-
ders, by exercising jurisdiction and law in particular places,” we now live in “a different kind 
of reality, a reality of information space, this network that has no inherent borders, bears no 
inherent jurisdiction”). These claims are modern incarnations of much older arguments. For 
the most well-known argument of this sort, see John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Inde-
pendence of Cyberspace (1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://
perma.cc/G2S3-5L99], which argues that cyberspace is ungovernable by nation-states. For a 
related view, see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1400-01 (1996), which argues that cyberspace is its own domain, 
deserving of its own rules, different from those that apply on any particular sovereign soil; 
and see also Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1202-05 (1998), 
which responds to Johnson and Post. 
29. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806 (2004) (arguing that courts are ill-equipped to 
make criminal law in areas where technology is fast evolving). For responses to Kerr’s insti-
tutional-competence argument, see Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice 
System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemp-
tions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 498 (2013), which argues that courts and legislatures are not an 
either/or proposition, but rather can work together to achieve optimal policy; David Alan 
Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think about Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 223, 224-33 (2015), which disputes Kerr’s view that privacy protections are best left to the 
political branches and questions whether the institutional comparison is fruitful; and Daniel 
J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codiﬁcation and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Defer-
ence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 761-74 (2005), which argues that the legislative record in ad-
dressing new technologies is insufficient, ﬁlled with gaps, and suggests that legislatures are 
neither as nimble nor as informed as Kerr suggests. 
30. See generally Kerr, supra note 29. 
31. See generally Solove, supra note 29. 
32. Much of this literature is focused on the procedural doctrines courts use to avoid cross-border 
litigation. See, e.g., Bookman, supra note 13, at 1085 (summarizing the litigation isolationism 
literature). 
33. See Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases: The Brave New 
World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) (exploring the doctrines federal 
courts use to avoid resolving transnational disputes); Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
338 
while others argue that judicial management of foreign relations is more com-
mon and less exceptional than previously thought.
34
 Whether these develop-
ments are cause for celebration or cause for concern depends on one’s views 
about the appropriate role for courts in foreign affairs,
35
 perhaps the central nor-
mative question among foreign affairs scholars.
36
 
These two literatures converge in the data-sovereignty cases. One might 
view the cases as especially ill-suited for courts because they require courts to set 
technology policy for the global internet. And yet, these cases continue to test 
both our foreign affairs doctrines and the judiciary’s ability to manage new areas 
of technology policy. We may need to look to other actors besides courts to man-
age these disputes, and we may also learn something new about the appropriate 
relationship between the judiciary and other branches in managing both foreign 
affairs and technology policy.
37
 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines several high-proﬁle internet-
governance cases and identiﬁes some of their shared features. The resolution of 
each of these issues deﬁnes, often for the ﬁrst time, the limits of state control 
over the internet. Because the phrase “sovereignty” is so notoriously broad, Part 
II offers a speciﬁc articulation of what that concept might mean in the context of 
the internet. This Part interrogates the idea that state sovereignty is diminished 
 
STAN L. REV. 941, 954-56 (2017) (summarizing the literature critical of courts’ increasingly 
narrow approach to transnational cases); David L. Noll, The New Conﬂicts Law, 2 STAN. J. 
COMPLEX LITIG. 41, 82-84 (2014) (arguing that courts are deﬁning their jurisdictional author-
ity narrowly to avoid hearing transnational cases); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational 
Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1113 (2010) (describing courts’ use of 
court-access doctrines to avoid hearing transnational disputes); Christopher A. Whytock, The 
Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 483-84 (2011) (presenting empirical 
evidence that while transnational litigation has grown over the last two decades, federal courts 
have become more reluctant to hear transnational cases). 
34. See Zachary D. Clopton, Judging Foreign States, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2016) (debunking the 
myth that courts avoid judging foreign sovereigns’ actions); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (showing 
that courts no longer treat foreign relations cases so differently from domestic cases). 
35. Compare Posner & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1198, with Dodge, supra note 14, at 2132. 
36. See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 694 (2000); 
Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 40 
(2014) (arguing that Chevron deference is an appropriate way to manage ambiguity about 
extraterritorial jurisdiction); Dodge, supra note 14, at 2132 (“A second myth of international 
comity is the notion that the executive branch enjoys a comparative advantage in making com-
ity determinations.”); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1207 (“[T]he expertise rationale 
for deference to the executive is stronger in the foreign relations setting than in the traditional 
Chevron setting.”). 
37. See infra Part V. 
litigating data sovereignty 
339 
in the internet era, and suggests that policymakers face a stark choice—not be-
tween an open internet and the “splinternet,” but between better and worse 
forms of a fragmented internet.
38
 Do we prefer a world where courts apply com-
ity principles, recognizing and deferring to foreign sovereign interests where ap-
propriate, or a world where they decline to do so and tempt states to assert their 
sovereign power forcefully? The answer is clearly the former. 
The ﬁnal three Parts turn to the sovereign-deference doctrines themselves 
and their judicial application. Part III introduces these doctrines as a way for 
courts to manage competing and overlapping claims of sovereignty over the in-
ternet. Part IV clariﬁes what those doctrines do not require. Most importantly, 
the Part shows that comity neither requires nor even exhibits a consistent bias 
against extraterritoriality. To the contrary, when the litigated dispute is transna-
tional, comity often calls for accommodating another sovereign’s extraterritorial 
regulations. That is, comity promotes recognition at least as much as it does re-
straint. Part V turns to institutional questions and offers an assessment—and a 
limited defense—of courts as internet policy makers. The Part concludes by look-
ing beyond courts to ask what a broad policy of sovereign deference might mean 
for other key actors in internet governance debates. 
i .  the data-sovereignty disputes 
There are a number of ﬂashpoint issues that implicate the state’s sovereign 
authority over the cross-border internet. This Part surveys some of the high-
proﬁle disputes, and it identiﬁes some of their shared characteristics. The par-
ticular substantive disputes in each case are not as important as the overall pic-
ture that emerges: across a number of different issues and jurisdictions, states 
and some of the world’s most powerful companies are regularly clashing in liti-
gation that asks courts to identify the limits of state sovereignty over the internet. 
 
38. The “splinternet” is the idea that the internet may be carved up in the image of nation-states. 
SCOTT MALCOMSON, SPLINTERNET: HOW GEOPOLITICS AND COMMERCE ARE FRAGMENTING 
THE WORLD WIDE WEB 7 (2016). 
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A. The Issues 
1. Takedown Orders for Extremist Content 
States routinely demand that internet service providers remove content—
such as a website or photos—because the content violates local law.
39
 In particu-
lar, governments have placed internet ﬁrms under increased pressure to take re-
sponsibility for extremist content that users post on their platforms.
40
 In June 
2017, several of the biggest internet companies—Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, 
and Google—formed an industry alliance to coordinate their efforts to identify 
and remove extremist content from their platforms.
41
 This was the latest in a 
series of industry actions aimed at satisfying European regulators who have 
pushed for more censorship of extremist content by internet intermediaries.
42
 
This pressure intensiﬁed following the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in 
2015.
43 
In response to those attacks, technology companies implemented a code 
of conduct under which they agreed to remove extremist and hateful content 
within twenty-four hours.
44
 However, the ﬁrms’ efforts did not satisfy European 
regulators.
45
 In the United Kingdom, the Home Affairs Select Committee pro-
duced a report slamming the companies for failing to do more.
46
 The rhetoric 
 
39. See GRIMMELMANN, supra note 22, at 119-213 (collecting cases regarding censorship over in-
ternet content). 
40. See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1040-49 (2018). 
41. Selena Larson, Tech Giants Bolster Collaborative Fight Against Terrorism, CNN MONEY (June 
26, 2017, 2:47 PM EDT), https://money.cnn.com/2017/06/26/technology/business/global 
-Internet-forum-to-counter-terrorism/index.html [https://perma.cc/U3G4-J8DY]. 
42. For a summary of these developments, see Citron, supra note 40. 
43. See, e.g., Mark Scott, Europe Presses American Tech Companies to Tackle Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/technology/europe-hate-speech 
-facebook-google-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/X8LU-HFPB]; Amar Toor, UK Lawmakers 
Say Facebook, Google, and Twitter Are ‘Consciously Failing’ to Fight ISIS Online, VERGE (Aug. 26, 
2016 5:58 AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2016/8/26/12656328/facebook-google 
-twitter-isis-propaganda-uk-report [https://perma.cc/KK7T-RLDF]. 
44. Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, EUR. COMMISSION (2016), 
https://edri.org/ﬁles/privatisedenf/euhatespeechcodeofconduct_20160531.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9MFT-ZQW8]. 
45. See Amar Toor, Germany Passes Controversial Law to Fine Facebook over Hate Speech, VERGE 
(June 30, 2017, 4:18 AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/30/15898386/germany 
-facebook-hate-speech-law-passed [https://perma.cc/WT2D-YW7T]. 
46. UK Lawmakers Criticize Social Media over Response to Extremist Content, REUTERS (Apr. 30, 
2017, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-socialmedia-idUSKBN17W0U1 
[https://perma.cc/6UE8-NZPH]. 
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was far from measured, with the chairwoman of the Committee saying publicly: 
“Social media companies’ failure to deal with illegal and dangerous material 
online is a disgrace.”
47
 
American efforts to regulate American social media ﬁrms have not been as 
successful as these European regulatory efforts.
48
 In the United States, proposals 
to force internet companies to moderate offensive or dangerous content have 
stalled, hindered by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency 
Act.
49
 The recent triumphs of European regulators also contrast with the ﬁrst 
round of internet-jurisdiction disputes, many of which centered around hate 
speech regulations permissible in Europe but not in the United States.
50
 In those 
disputes, technology ﬁrms resisted cross-border takedown requests and often 
won. Today, ﬁrms bow to pressures in one market to remove certain content, 
and the consequences are felt around the world. Facebook’s “Community Stand-
ards”—which govern what content can stay up or must come down—apply glob-
ally, “without differentiation to cultural or national boundaries.”
51
 Because the 
takedowns apply worldwide, scholars and activists have expressed concern about 
one sovereign having the ability to set internet speech policy internationally.
52
 
2. Delisting and the Right to Be Forgotten 
Sometimes, rather than ordering a provider to remove content from its own 
website, states ask the provider to stop linking to or directing users to content 
hosted elsewhere, including by removing links to this content from search re-
sults. These delisting requests—typically lodged against search engines like 
Google—are mostly used to force companies to remove links in accordance with 
 
47. Id. 
48. See Citron, supra note 40, at 1037-38. 
49. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). For a discussion of both, see Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, 
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1453 nn.110 & 111 (2011); and Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet 
Will Not Break: Defying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 406-07 
(2017). 
50. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (ﬁnding that enforcing a French judgment that would require Yahoo! 
to make geolocation changes to its technology in California violated the First Amendment and 
was therefore unenforceable). 
51. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1642 (2018). 
52. See Citron, supra note 40, at 1056. 
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the so-called right to be forgotten.
53
  Since the European Court of Justice 
acknowledged this right, Google has taken down links to nearly a million web-
sites,
54




Foremost among these challenges to delisting orders is Google’s litigation in 
Spain, where the data protection authority, Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos (AEPD), ordered Google to remove material at a user’s request.
56
 Google’s 
local and international offices sought clariﬁcation from Audiencia Nacional, 
Spain’s highest court,
57
 which then sought clariﬁcation from the European Un-
ion Court of Justice (CJEU) on the European Data Protection Directive.
58
 The 
CJEU sidestepped the question of whether the European Union’s Data Protec-
tion Directive guarantees a fundamental right to be forgotten,
59
 but it found that 
Google is a data “controller” within Spanish territory for the purposes of deter-
mining the state’s personal jurisdiction over Google.
60
  This meant that the 
AEDP’s order applied to Google. The court left open the question of how far the 
ruling reached on the internet—whether just to Spanish domains, to users with 
 
53. Alan Travis & Charles Arthur, EU Court Backs ‘Right to be Forgotten’: Google Must Amend Results 
on Request, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may
/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results [https://perma.cc/M8G5-DDRB] 
(describing how EU data protection laws force search engines like Google to remove private 
information at the request of users). 
54. Search Removals Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP., https:// 
transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview (showing that from May 29, 2014 to 
August 5, 2018, Google has received requests to delist 2,300,526 websites, and has agreed to 
delist 1,010,276 of those websites). 
55. In addition to Google’s disputes with Spanish and French authorities, the ﬁrm has also fought 
the right to be forgotten in Argentina, Japan, and other countries. See Robert C. Post, Data 
Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Construction of the 
Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 989-90 (2018); see also Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to be Forgotten’ 
Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06 
/technology/personaltech/right-to-be-forgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html [https://
perma.cc/6CHR-NSMD] (discussing how the European Court of Justice’s decision could re-
verberate throughout the world). 
56. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065 
[https://perma.cc/Q694-URG7]. 
57. Id. ¶ 1. 
58. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. 
59. Id. ¶¶ 89-99. 
60. Id. ¶¶ 32-41, 43, 45, 50, 57, 60. 
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Spanish IP addresses, or perhaps to users globally.
61
 Google convened an advi-
sory committee to discuss how to implement the ruling.
62
 The committee’s re-
port concluded that Google should remove offending content from the relevant 
country-level domain—in this case, www.google.es—but not from 
www.google.com, even for users located within Spain.
63
 In response, European 




This set up the company’s dispute with France’s data-protection authority, 
the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL).
65
  In 
France, Google complied with delisting requests by removing offending material 
from the country-level domain, google.fr.
66
 After Google concluded that it had 
the technology to identify user location, it also delisted search results for users 
that appeared to be in France.
67
 The CNIL concluded that this was insufficient, 
determining that Google must delist offending material not just on all Google 
products within the EU, but also on all Google products wherever they are ac-
cessed worldwide.
68
 Google rejected this argument and appealed to the Conseil 
d’État, France’s highest court for administrative justice.
69
 That court in turn re-
ferred the case to the European Court of Justice, where the case is pending.
70
 
Delisting orders can also be used to ask ﬁrms to stop linking to content that 
violates intellectual property rules.
71
 For example, on June 27, 2017, the Canadian 
 
61. Id. 




64. Natasha Lomas, Google Faces Fight in Europe on Search Delisting, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 2015), 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/02/06/google-rtbf-report [https://perma.cc/CCQ3-D5KW]. 
65. CNIL Orders Google to Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the Search Engine, CNIL (June 
12, 2015), https://www.cnil.fr/fr/node/15790 [https://perma.cc/Z92U-8SJE]. 
66. Walker, supra note 11. 
67. Id. 
68. See Julia Fioretti, France Fines Google over ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’ REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2016, 12:38 
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-france-privacy/france-ﬁnes-google-over 
-right-to-be-forgotten-idUSKCN0WQ1WX [https://perma.cc/YD76-KHUA]. 
69. Walker, supra note 11. 
70. CE Sect., July 19, 2017, 399922 (Fr.), http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-Avis-Publications
/Decisions/Selection-des-decisions-faisant-l-objet-d-une-communication-particuliere/CE 
-19-juillet-2017-GOOGLE-INC [https://perma.cc/XT3J-R79G]. 
71. Joe Mullin, Google Must Alter Worldwide Search Results, Per Orders from Canada’s Top Court, 
ARS TECHNICA (June 28, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/06 
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Supreme Court held that Google must delist web pages relating to Datalink, a 
ﬁrm accused of violating Canadian intellectual property law.
72
 The Supreme 
Court upheld the order of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia, which had 
demanded that Google remove references to pages selling Datalink’s wares not 
only on Google’s Canadian site, google.ca, but also on all Google websites.
73
 The 
order applied to Google’s products anywhere in the world.
74
 Google appealed 
the lower court’s order, arguing that the takedown request represented an invalid 
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
75
 The Canadian Supreme Court disa-
greed by a seven-to-two vote, and held that the order was appropriate in scope.
76
 
Google did not take issue with the intellectual property dispute between 
Equustek and Datalink.
77
 Nor was Google averse to fashioning a remedy,
78
 pro-
posing to remove the offending links from its Canadian domain, google.ca.
79
 
Rather, Google expressed concern about the global reach of the injunction, 
which it argued set a dangerous precedent for other countries.
80
 A number of 
civil-society groups also weighed in, ﬁling amicus curiae briefs in support of 
Google’s position and arguing that a worldwide injunction both violated U.S. 
sovereignty
81
 and set a dangerous precedent for other countries.
82
 Speciﬁcally, 
Google and the civil-society groups worried about the precedent the case might 
set for other cross-border delisting requests—especially those made pursuant to 





.cc/JN2Z-HH7N] (describing Equustek’s successful de-indexing case against Google). 
72. Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 826 (Can.). 
73. Id. 
74. Complaint, supra note 7, at 2. 
75. Id. 
76. Equustek, [2017] 1 S.C.R. at 826. 
77. The underlying dispute was between Equustek, a Canadian networking ﬁrm, and Datalink, a 
ﬁrm that allegedly stole and attempted to resell some of Equustek’s products and designs. See 
Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, 63 B.C.L.R. 5th 145 (Can. B.C. S.C.). 
78. Equustek, [2017] 1 S.C.R. at 836-37. 
79. Andrew Keane Woods, No, the Canadian Supreme Court Did Not Ruin the Internet, LAWFARE 
(July 6, 2017, 2:25 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/no-canadian-supreme-court-did-not-ruin 
-Internet [https://perma.cc/6VVP-TBDG]. 
80. Equustek, [2017] 1 S.C.R. at 846-47. 
81. See Factum of Intervener Electronic Frontier Foundation, Equustek, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (No. 
36602). 
82. See Factum of Intervener Human Rights Watch, Equustek, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.) (No. 
36602). 
83. See Woods, supra note 79. 
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Whatever the reason for the delisting request, the question in both Equustek 
and Google v. CNIL is not whether the state can regulate a search engine’s means 
of serving search results, but whether the state can enforce its delisting orders 
across borders—and, indeed, what counts as a border.
84
 
3. Law Enforcement Requests for Data 
States also exert extraterritorial control over the internet in the context of law 
enforcement efforts to access foreign-held data. Governments seek access to this 
data for a number of reasons,
85
 but their interest is fundamentally traceable to 
the fact that evidence of crimes is now often digital,
86
 often stored in the cloud,
87
 
and often managed by a service provider located in another jurisdiction.
88
 This 
evidence routinely crosses borders because much of it passes through the wires 
of the global internet.
89
 As long as this is the case, law enforcement will continue 
to face jurisdictional barriers to accessing criminal evidence.
90
 
Microsoft’s recent dispute with the Department of Justice is a prime example 
of this phenomenon.
91
 When the DOJ sought the contents of an email account 
that Microsoft stored in Ireland, Microsoft refused on the grounds that the 
Stored Communications Act (SCA) did not apply extraterritorially.
92
 The tech-
nology ﬁrm initially challenged the order in court and lost.
93
 On appeal before 
the Second Circuit, the ﬁrm won.
94




84. See infra Section III.C. 
85. Woods, supra note 15, at 742. 




90. Id. at 745-47. 
91. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
92. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Con-
trolled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en 
banc). 
93. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft 
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
94. Microsoft Corp., 855 F.3d 53. 
95. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Con-
trolled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 
356 (2017) (mem.). 
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and heard oral arguments,
96
 but the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data 
(CLOUD) Act ultimately mooted the case.
97
 
The question before the Court was whether ECPA applies extraterritorially.
98
 
The Second Circuit below held that it does not, but ﬁve other courts had reached 
a different conclusion. These courts held that the relevant location of the search 
is in the United States (where Microsoft receives search warrants) and therefore 




These are two different approaches to the same cross-border problem. The 
Second Circuit chose to address the jurisdictional questions head on.
100
 It con-
sidered the weight of the authority and decided that limiting ECPA’s territorial 
reach “serves the interests of comity that . . . ordinarily govern the conduct of 
cross-boundary criminal investigations.”
101
 In other words, the Second Circuit 
saw the issue as a matter of sovereign deference. The other courts to consider the 
issue skirted this question by ﬁnding that the disputed activity was domestic, 
regardless of where the data is stored.
102
 They concluded that asking an internet 
ﬁrm to produce records was therefore not a novel application of ECPA across 
borders, but rather a domestic application of a search warrant, consistent with 
the courts’ longstanding ability to compel ﬁrms to disclose evidence that the ﬁrm 




96. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per 
curiam) (No. 17-2). 
97. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam). 
98. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
99. See, e.g., In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@Gmail.com that Is Stored at Prem-
ises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757, 2017 WL 2480752 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re 
Search of Content that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, No. 16-mc-80263, 2017 
WL 1398279 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2017); In re Search of Premises Located at [Redacted] 
@Yahoo.com, No. 17-mj-1238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2017); In re Info. Associated with One Yahoo 
Email Address that Is Stored at Premises Controlled by Yahoo, No. 17-M-1234, 2017 WL 
706307 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21, 2017); In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, 232 F. 
Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
100. Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197. 
101. Id. at 221. 
102. In re Search of Info. Associated with [Redacted]@Gmail.com, 2017 WL 2480752, at *6 (“Every 
court outside the Second Circuit that has considered the issue has rejected the holding of Mi-
crosoft . . . .”). 
103. In re Info. Associated with One Yahoo Email, 2017 WL 706307, at *3. 
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The enactment of the CLOUD Act resolves only some of these issues.
104
 Un-
der the Act, U.S. law enforcement can now obtain a search warrant under 18 
U.S.C. § 2703 for data regardless of where that data resides.
105
 However, the Act 
does not clarify how U.S. providers should respond to lawful requests for data 
from foreign governments that have not arrived at an executive agreement with 
the United States, as contemplated under the Act.
106
 For example, suppose that 
a U.S. provider gets a request from a country not covered by the CLOUD Act; 
can the provider reply directly under local law or must the country apply for a 
U.S. warrant using the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) process? The 
Act is simply unclear. The revisions to the SCA allow U.S. courts to grant war-
rants that reach foreign-held data, but they do not appear to resolve the question 
of whether the SCA prohibits U.S. providers from complying with foreign law 
enforcement requests for foreign-held data. 
4. Surveillance 
States have also sought to exercise extraterritorial control over the internet 
by enacting legislation that requires technology companies to store within their 
borders data about the country’s citizens. These efforts do not align with the way 
internet companies organize their networks. Internet ﬁrms design their net-
works in ways that optimize for a number of different variables, including deliv-
ery speed, storage cost, national laws, and more.
107
 As part of this optimization, 
some data will naturally leave one jurisdiction to be processed in another.
108
 Re-
quiring companies to store data in the country from which it originated would 
defeat the many beneﬁts of a global network and would instead impose enor-




104. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, §§ 103, 105 (2018) (to be 
codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2523, 2713). 
105. Id. § 103(a)(1) (to be codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2713). 
106. The question of whether and how ECPA applies abroad is still left somewhat unclear. The 
CLOUD Act’s drafters clearly envisioned a world in which countries would be incentivized to 
strike agreements with the United States in order to make direct requests for data, but argu-
ably if and where ECPA does not apply abroad—say, in an entirely foreign matter with regard 
to foreign-held data—why should that country feel the need to seek such an agreement? 
107. See David Mytton, Cloud Location Matters—Latency, Privacy, Redundancy, SERVER DENSITY 
BLOG (Aug. 21, 2014), https://blog.serverdensity.com/cloud-location-matters-latency 
-privacy-redundancy [https://perma.cc/YLY4-AGD8]. 
108. See id. 
109. Anupam Chander, Why Democrats and Republicans Should Oppose Data Localization, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN REL. (July 20, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-democrats-and 
-republicans-should-oppose-data-localization [https://perma.cc/653V-YW7C]. 
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Forced data localization is also harmful because it makes data more vulner-
able to state surveillance. The storage location of data is enormously consequen-
tial for those concerned about interception by spying eyes,
110
 notwithstanding 
arguments that location does not matter.
111
 It follows that states seeking to pro-
tect the privacy of their citizens might strive either: (1) to keep their data within 
the country’s borders, where it can be secured, or (2) to secure assurances from 
the states where the data are being sent. 
These goals motivated the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, developed by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce in conjunction with the European Commission, 
which allowed ﬁrms to self-certify that they would not make public certain kinds 
of personal data.
112
 In the wake of the Snowden revelations about the scale of 
American surveillance on foreign targets,
113
  Austrian citizen Maximilian 
Schrems challenged the Safe Harbor principles
114
 and won. Here, the CJEU 
ruled that the Safe Harbor regime violated the Data Protection Directive because 
it provided insufficient protection from U.S. government surveillance.
115
 Al-
though this ruling created issues for both American and European ﬁrms doing 
cross-border business,
116
 it was particularly challenging for the world’s largest 
technology companies, which are primarily American ﬁrms.
117
 In response, gov-
 
110. Woods, supra note 15, at 753. 
111. Cf. supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
112. The Safe Harbor regime was approved by the European Commission in a July 26, 2000 Deci-
sion, Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7, and pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, repealed by 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 
113. See Ewen MacAskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded: What the Revelations Mean for You, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01
/snowden-nsa-ﬁles-surveillance-revelations-decoded [https://perma.cc/M9R4-6QTL]. 




116. Timothy Edgar, Surveillance Reform Is Only Hope for Reviving Safe Harbor, LAWFARE (Oct. 7, 
2015, 4:04 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/surveillance-reform-only-hope-reviving-safe
-harbor [https://perma.cc/2XA2-RBDS ] (“Just to be clear about the stakes—the US-EU safe 
harbor agreement is vital to transatlantic trade, and not just for big technology ﬁrms like Face-
book and Google.”). 
117. See id. 
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ernments on both sides of the Atlantic worked to devise a remedy, and imple-
mented a new regime called the EU-US Privacy Shield.
118
 The Privacy Shield is 
a self-certiﬁcation regime much like the Safe Harbor principles, but with more 
stringent privacy policy requirements and slightly stricter compliance obliga-
tions.
119
 It quickly gained approval from relevant authorities in the United States 




However, this regime is fragile. It depends on the assurances the U.S. gov-
ernment made in the Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28).
121
 PPD-28 is a 
policy document developed by the Obama Administration that commits Ameri-
can signals intelligence efforts to meeting certain minimization, oversight, and 
transparency requirements, addressing in particular some concerns of allies 
about the collection of data on foreign persons.
122
 In response, Digital Rights 
Ireland ﬁled an “action for annulment” with Europe’s second highest court, chal-
lenging the Privacy Shield on the grounds that the decision ratiﬁes the American 
authorities’ foreign-surveillance program without due respect for the privacy 
laws of all the sovereigns covered by the regime.
123
 The adequacy of PPD-28 and 
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/CQ6T-SYBG] (comparing the Privacy Shield’s and Safe Harbor regime’s provisions). 
120. See Cameron Kerry & Alan Charles Raul, The Economic Case for Preserving PPD-28 and Privacy 
Shield, LAWFARE (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/economic-case 
-preserving-ppd-28-and-privacy-shield [https://perma.cc/2B2Z-285R]. 
121. See id. 
122. Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities, WHITE 
HOUSE § 4 (Jan. 17, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01
/17/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [https://perma.cc/829D 
-AR7K]. 
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5. Digital Trade Restrictions 
States have also exercised extraterritorial control over trade in digital goods. 
What does it mean to “import” or “export” in a world where ﬁrms send products 
across borders digitally? Consider the case of ClearCorrect, a dental-products 
company that takes scans of customers’ teeth in the United States and sends 
those scans to Pakistan, where a digital model is created and then sent back to 
the United States, where the model is used to drive a 3-D printer that produces 
the ultimate product.
125
 When a competitor accused the ﬁrm of violating a pa-
tent, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) had to determine whether 
it had jurisdiction over the dispute.
126
 Relevant to the inquiry, the Tariff Act gives 
the ITC authority over the importation of articles.
127
 The ITC thus had to deter-
mine whether emailing designs from Pakistan to have them printed in Texas 
constituted the importation of articles,
 
and concluded that it did.
128
 The Federal 
Circuit reversed, ﬁnding that “articles” means “material things,” and that the 
ITC accordingly does not have jurisdiction over digitally transmitted designs.
129
 
The court noted that “it is difficult to see how one could physically stop electronic 
transmissions at the borders under the current statutory scheme.”
130
 Many par-
ties ﬁled amicus briefs in the case, including the Internet Association
131
—which 
represents Apple, Facebook, Google, and other internet companies— the Motion 
Picture Association of America, and the Recording Industry Association of 
America.
132
 The matter ended when the ITC declined to petition for a writ of 
certiorari, but courts have not heard the last of sovereignty concerns in the con-
text of digital imports.
133
 The question of restraints on digital trade played a ma-
 
125. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
126. Certain Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances and Methods of Producing 
Same; Notice of Institution of Formal Enforcement Proceeding, 77 Fed. Reg. 25747, 25747 
(May 1, 2012). 
127. Tariff Act of 1930 § 337, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (2018). 
128. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1287-89. 
129. Id. at 1286-87. 
130. Id. at 1295. 
131. Brief of the Internet Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants & Urging Reversal, 
ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d 1283 (No. 2014-1527). 
132. Brief of the Motion Picture Ass’n of America & the Recording Industry Ass’n of America as 
Amici Curiae in Support of the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Petition for Rehearing 
En Banc, ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d 1283 (No. 2014-1527). 
133. Ryan Davis, ITC Won’t Appeal ClearCorrect Patent Ruling to High Court, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 
2016, 6:50 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/834949/itc-won-t-appeal 
-clearcorrect-patent-ruling-to-high-court [https://perma.cc/4HZV-FG3Y]. 
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jor role in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership negotiations
134
 and is now a key focus of 
the U.S. Trade Representative.
135
 
B. Common Features 
These seemingly disparate issues share a common set of features. In each case 
(1) an old problem wears new clothes, thanks to a once-physical process becom-
ing digital; (2) there is a cross-border dimension to the problem that raises ju-
risdictional questions about the scope of territorial or extraterritorial authority; 
(3) the cross-border nature raises conﬂicts-of-laws questions; and (4) there are 
opportunities for arbitrage that ﬂow from the fact that laws are not harmonized 
and internet business can easily be conducted across borders. 
1. Digitization 
In each of these issues, a relatively old and settled area of the law—like 
search-and-seizure law or free-speech law—appears unresolved because the ac-
tivity in question is now digital. For example, while there are many cases articu-
lating the standards for importation of articles,
136
 before the ClearCorrect case 
there were none in the Federal Circuit about whether digital ﬁles constituted ar-
ticles.
137
 Regarding the production of evidence, the fact that evidence is now dig-
ital often makes it harder to access, either because it is held by a provider located 
in another jurisdiction or because it is held in another jurisdiction.
138
 Digitiza-
tion makes old problems new by taking formerly domestic issues—like what 
sorts of speech can be prohibited, or when governments can compel the produc-
tion of criminal evidence—and introducing a cross-border dimension, which 
 
134. See Greg Hicks, Digital Trade and Cross Border Data Flows in the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership, CTR. 
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 12, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/digital-trade 
-and-cross-border-data-ﬂows-trans-paciﬁc-partnership [https://perma.cc/AR4U-5Z36]. 
135. Key Barriers to Digital Trade, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2017), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2017/march/key-barriers 
-digital-trade [https://perma.cc/59Y4-GBNQ]. 
136. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334, 1342-44 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (Newman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
137. See Brian Busey et al., Indecision at the ITC: Ramiﬁcations of the ITC’s First Stay of a Remedy 
Order, MORRISON & FOERSTER (Aug. 24, 2015), https://mofoatitc.mofo.com/itc-procedures
/indecision-at-the-itc-ramiﬁcations-of-the-itcs-ﬁrst-stay-of-a-remedy-order [https://perma
.cc/FE33-7DRX].  
138. Woods, supra note 15, at 739. 
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typically arises because the data are, or the provider is, now connected to a global 
network. 
2. The Cross-Border Cloud 
The cross-border nature of the internet is particularly salient outside of the 
United States. The vast majority of internet users hail from countries other than 
the United States.
139
 Yet American ﬁrms continue to operate the most popular 
websites and internet services around the world.
140
 This means that, for most 
state regulators, regulating the internet means regulating across borders. For ex-
ample, criminal evidence was typically found in the same jurisdiction as the 
crime and the criminal.
141
 This is no longer true. Now law enforcement agents 
routinely seek access to evidence controlled by foreign internet companies—typ-
ically American ﬁrms—who store or control that evidence in another jurisdic-
tion.
142
 Speech issues are similar. France once could control what speech was 
made within its territory and had in fact sought remedial action for impermissi-
ble domestic speech.
143
 No more. When the French government asks Twitter to 
remove offending material, it depends on the cooperation of an American com-
pany, which will often need to take action in another country.
144
 The company 
might raise a number of arguments, including that the relevant data is abroad; 
the company is headquartered abroad; the team that handles takedown requests 
is located outside of France; the terms of service are subject to California law; 
and more.
145
 Each of these claims may frustrate the French regulatory effort. 
 
139. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 287. 
140. Woods, supra note 15, at 741. 
141. Id. at 745. 
142. Id. 
143. 1 CENSORSHIP: A WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA 39 (Derek Jones ed., 2001) (describing the censor-
ship in France of La Question). 
144. See, e.g., U.S. Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Against Twitter over ISIS Rhetoric, NBC NEWS (Aug. 11, 
2016, 3:26 AM EST), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/u-s-judge-dismisses 
-lawsuit-against-twitter-over-islamic-state-n627661 [https://perma.cc/9JAP-YBH5]. 
145. See, e.g., Warwick Ashford, Google Claims It Is Not Subject to UK Privacy Laws, COMPUTER 
WKLY. (Aug. 19, 2013, 8:12 AM), http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240203739
/Google-claims-it-is-not-subject-to-UK-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/EBW3-2F7M] 
(noting Google’s domicile theory of jurisdiction); Aurelien Breeden, French Court Rules It Has 
Jurisdiction over Facebook in Nude Painting Case, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:17 
AM), https://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/06/french-court-rules-it-has-jurisdiction
-over-facebook-in-nude-painting-case [https://perma.cc/YQ45-C68D] (noting that Face-
book argued its terms of service prevented a French court from exercising jurisdiction); Chris-
topher Williams, Google Argues UK Privacy Laws Do Not Apply to It, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 18, 2013, 
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3. Conﬂicts of Laws 
The extraterritorial nature of these issues often raises conﬂict-of-laws issues. 
If France asks Yahoo! to remove internet content from its site globally, that may 
give rise to a direct conﬂict of laws—for instance, if that content is protected 
speech in California.
146
 The same is true for law enforcement requests. If a court 
in California orders an internet ﬁrm to produce data held in Germany, it may 




The ﬁrst step in any conﬂicts analysis is to determine whether there is a con-
ﬂict at all.
148
 In many cases, there is more hand-wringing about conﬂicts than 
actual conﬂict of laws.
149
 For example, in Microsoft Ireland, Microsoft argued that 
“[t]he power to embark on unilateral law enforcement incursions into a foreign 
sovereign country—directly or indirectly—has profound foreign policy conse-
quences.”
150
 Ireland agreed, ﬁling an amicus curiae brief arguing that its own 
sovereignty was at stake.
151
 However, neither Microsoft nor Ireland pointed to a 
particular law in Ireland that would be violated as a consequence of compelling 
Microsoft to produce emails stored in Ireland.
152
 Something similar occurred in 
 
5:26 PM BST), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/10250801/Google-argues 
-UK-privacy-laws-do-not-apply-to-it.html [https://perma.cc/MEM8-96J6] (“Google has 
argued that as an American company it is not covered by British privacy laws. It said there 
was ‘no jurisdiction’ for the case to be heard [in the United Kingdom] because its consumer 
services are provided by Google Inc, based in Silicon Valley, rather than Google UK.”). 
146. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 
(N.D. Cal. 2001). 
147. See Microsoft to Use German Data Centers for Privacy, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Nov. 16, 2015), 
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-and-techology/microsoft-to-use 
-german-data-centers-for-privacy [https://perma.cc/5JS8-FWBE]. 
148. Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 291-92 (1990). 
149. Id.; see also Woods, supra note 15, at 775 (“The question is not whether one state’s laws are 
incompatible with another state’s laws; rather, the question is whether both states can apply 
their laws and have a compelling interest in doing so. If they do not have such an interest, 
there is merely a false conﬂict and the problem is resolved.”). 
150. Brief for Appellant at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain 
E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 
14-2985). 
151. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ireland, supra note 18, at 3. 
152. Woods, supra note 15, at 775 n.226 (“Ireland has not explicitly argued that a conﬂict of laws 
exists.”). The European Union’s amicus brief raises the possibility that Microsoft’s compliance 
with the order might be inconsistent with the EU’s General Data Privacy Regulation, but the 
brief does not say outright that it would be. Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of 
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Equustek, in which Google argued that the court’s worldwide takedown order 
constituted a breach of international comity.
153
 Google made this argument even 
though, as the court noted, it had offered no evidence that compliance with the 
court order would produce a conﬂict of laws anywhere.
154
 
4. Arbitrage Opportunities 
Firms that operate across borders are able to take advantage of arbitrage op-
portunities.
155
 The best-known examples of arbitrage come from tax law. Ap-
ple—one of the wealthiest companies in the world—famously pays little corpo-
rate tax through clever accounting that takes advantage of jurisdictional 
differences.
156
 But Apple is hardly alone,
157
 and tax is not the only area that pre-
sents opportunities for arbitrage. Companies deploy similar strategies for data 
storage: they carefully choose where to store data based on the location of users, 
ﬁber optic cable placements, storage cost, and national laws.
158
 
Firms will also operate strategically to exploit differences between one state’s 
laws and another’s. For example, Yahoo! and Google move data around the 
world between company servers located on several different continents.
159
 As a 
consequence, they regularly tell governments that the data is stored in another 
 
the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam) (No. 17-2). 
153. Factum of the Intervener the Attorney General of Canada, supra note 18, at 7. 
154. Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 828 (Can.) (“If Google has evidence 
that complying with such an injunction would require it to violate the laws of another juris-
diction, including interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the Brit-
ish Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly. To date, Google has made no 
such application.”). 
155. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) (describing how arbitrage 
opportunities are created when two jurisdictions regulate the same conduct differently). 
156. Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low
-tax-states-and-nations.html [https://perma.cc/2WPK-E3RE]. 
157. David Leonhardt, The Big Companies that Avoid Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/18/opinion/the-big-companies-that-avoid-taxes.html 
[https://perma.cc/T7L3-QWXW]. 
158. Mytton, supra note 107. 
159. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 3, Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re 
Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 
855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 14-2985) (“Major U.S.-based providers like Google and Yahoo! 
store a customer’s email content across an ever-changing mix of facilities around the world.”). 
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jurisdiction, and is therefore not accessible to local law enforcement.
160
 In the 
wake of the Microsoft Ireland decision, ﬁrms made the same arguments to U.S. 
law enforcement, suggesting that data could be moved to a jurisdiction where it 
is inaccessible to law enforcement at the ﬁrm’s command.
161
 
The CLOUD Act resolves some of these jurisdictional challenges with regard 
to law enforcement access to data,
162
 but the broader issue remains: the internet 
makes regulatory arbitrage especially simple. Firms can choose, among other 
things, where to be headquartered, where to keep money and employees (both 
of which risk being seized),
163
 and which country’s laws will govern the terms 
of service.
164
 Each of these decisions allows the ﬁrm to determine how much lev-
erage states have over it. 
5. Sovereignty Concerns 
Finally, and most importantly, the data-sovereignty disputes all raise con-
cerns about state sovereignty—about the state’s ability to regulate the global in-
ternet in ways that do not conﬂict with the prerogatives of other sovereigns. 
While the data-sovereignty cases come to courts framed as conﬂicts between a 
ﬁrm and a state, they implicitly involve a conﬂict between two states, each one 
seeking to regulate the same internet conduct. The Microsoft Ireland case was a 
good example. At one level, the case presented a domestic question of statutory 
interpretation: did Congress intend for the SCA to apply abroad, and are the 
facts of the case extraterritorial or domestic?
165
 But in another sense, the case was 
 
160. See, e.g., id. at 19 (“[T]he only employees who can access the entirety of a customer’s account, 
including those portions momentarily stored overseas, are located in the United States.”). 
161. Orin Kerr, The Surprising Implications of the Microsoft/Ireland Warrant Case, WASH. POST: VOL-
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Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloud
-act-welcome-legislative-ﬁx-cross-border-data-problems [https://perma.cc/7VZS-MBSL]. 
163. For example, Facebook’s Vice President for Latin American operations was arrested in Brazil 
for not complying with a law enforcement request there. Will Connors, Facebook Executive 
Arrested in Brazil, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook 
-executive-arrested-in-brazil-1456851506 [https://perma.cc/SAJ2-D93F]. 
164. Klonick notes that the major social media ﬁrms’ terms of service are heavily inﬂuenced by 
U.S. law, including the First Amendment. Klonick, supra note 51, at 1621. 
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interpretation in line with the Morrison v. National Australian Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010), two-
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about whether data stored in Ireland ought to be accessible to Irish or American 
authorities or both. As a number of amicus briefs from foreign sovereigns sug-
gested,
166
 the case implicated intersovereign relations, despite being framed be-
fore the Court as a dispute between an American ﬁrm and American law enforce-
ment. And, as this Article has shown, the phenomenon of sovereigns asserting 
their interests over internet conduct before a foreign court is hardly unique to 
the issue of law enforcement access to data abroad.
167
 
What are we to make of the fact that sovereign-to-sovereign disputes are be-
ing resolved in cases that involve corporate intermediaries? One common reac-
tion is to make two distinct but related arguments: (1) intermediaries threaten 
state sovereignty; and (2) as a result of the world moving online, state power is 
in decline. That is, because private intermediaries—often corporations—are able 
to exploit arbitrage opportunities, they raise concerns about the “quasi-sover-
eign”
168
 power of intermediaries. In particular, some worry that the power of 
private ﬁrms threatens national sovereignty.
169
 This is understandable, given 
how much power some internet companies wield. Because these corporations 
have considerable latitude in how they handle customer data, how they structure 
their operations, and which legal rules they comply with, they have become pow-
erful organizations that play key roles in determining major aspects of internet 
policy. Consider takedown requests.
170
 Regardless of whether France demands 
that Facebook take down certain content—hate speech, say, or private infor-
mation—Facebook’s own content rules and terms of service shape online free-
 
step analysis: (1) whether the SCA applies extraterritorially and (2) whether the focus of the 
statute is implicated by the facts of the case that are domestic or extraterritorial). 
166. See, e.g., Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Neither Party, supra note 152; Brief for Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (per curiam) (No. 
17-2); Brief for the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner as Amicus Curiae in Support of Nei-
ther Party, Microsoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2); Brief of the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Mi-
crosoft, 138 S. Ct. 1186 (No. 17-2). 
167. See supra Section I.A. 
168. Rozenshtein, supra note 28, at 188. 
169. See supra note 28. 
170. See, e.g., Government Requests for User Data, FACEBOOK TRANSPARENCY REP., https:// 
transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests [https://perma.cc/3FAD-H36N]; 
Government Requests to Remove Content, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REP., https:// 
transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/overview [https://perma.cc/TJU9 
-DXYT]; Microsoft Corp. Soc. Responsibility, Content Removal Requests Report: July-Decem-
ber, 2017, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/about/corporate-responsibility
/crrr [https://perma.cc/9A23-EFW9]. 




 In fact, those rules may be more inﬂuential in shaping speech 
on the platform than any one state’s law.
172
 For this reason, Kate Klonick calls 
these ﬁrms “the New Governors,”
173
 and she develops a “conceptualization of 
online platforms as governance.”
174
 
In addition to setting substantive policy, intermediaries also play a role in 
determining which states can enforce their laws and to what extent they can do 
so.
175
 In the cross-border law enforcement context, intermediaries may have lit-
tle say in the substantive criminal laws of a given country, but they have enor-
mous latitude in determining when and how to comply with law enforcement 
demands for evidence.
176
 Firms hoping to bolster their public image as defend-
ers of user privacy may choose to drag their feet, claim they cannot ﬁnd respon-
sive data, and even move the data into another jurisdiction, scuttling lawful in-
vestigations.
177
 In the surveillance context, Alan Rozenshtein has argued that 
intermediaries are powerful entities, without whom the government cannot do 
its job.
178
 He notes that “internet companies challenge the state’s monopoly over 
security, the very locus of traditional conceptions of sovereignty.”
179
 Govern-
ment surveillance efforts are shaped not only by whether the ﬁrm complies with 
requests to coordinate, but also by the nature of the ﬁrm itself. For example, if a 
ﬁrm chooses to encrypt all customer communications, it can engineer itself into 
 
171. Klonick, supra note 51, at 1620. 
172. Id. at 1630-62. 
173. Id. at 1662-64. 
174. Id. at 1602. Although Klonick notes that governance does not mean government, id. at 1617, 
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178. Rozenshtein, supra note 28. 
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a position of being unhelpful to surveillance efforts.
180
 Because it controls the 
data, the intermediary can shape much of the key policy landscape. 
The rise of intermediary power therefore corresponds with a sense that state 
sovereignty is diminishing. In the surveillance realm, U.S. law enforcement 
agents regularly complain of the “going dark” problem to describe the spread of 
encrypted communications tools—a term that reﬂects a sense of loss.
181
 Where 
the state could previously intercept domestic communications—usually with a 
wiretap—today it ﬁnds that many lines of communication have been en-
crypted.
182
 Activity in the digital sphere also has the potential to make it harder 
for the state to manage internal affairs.
183
 In 2015, Russia and China signed an 
agreement to jointly combat the use of information technology “to interfere in 
the internal affairs of states; undermine sovereignty, political, economic and so-
cial stability; [and] disturb public order.”
184
 The concern, according to Russian 
officials, is that the internet exposes the state to foreign espionage, cybersecurity 
attacks, and civil unrest.
185
 
States’ own statements about their loss of power might seem like deﬁnitive 
proof that state power is on the wane in the digital era. Indeed, there are a num-
ber of areas where state efforts are frustrated by private intermediaries. But the 
rise of corporate intermediaries and state fears about their inﬂuence over online 
conduct do not tell the whole story. 
 
180. See Nathaniel Mott, Take That, FBI: Apple Goes All in on Encryption, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/15/apple-fbi-ﬁle-encryption-wwdc 
[https://perma.cc/SC26-F6VA]. 
181. Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and Privacy: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2015) (joint statement of James B. Comey, 
Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, and Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., Dept. of Jus-
tice) (describing how encryption and other developments “have eroded our ability to obtain 
electronic information and evidence pursuant to a court order or warrant. We in law enforce-
ment often refer to this problem as ‘Going Dark.’”). 
182. Id. 
183. See Gary King et al., How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective 
Expression, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2013) (showing how the primary concern for China’s 
censors is not criticism, as commonly believed, but rather attempts at social unrest through 
collective action); see also Jessi Hempel, Social Media Made the Arab Spring, But Couldn’t Save 
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i i .  the case for sovereign deference 
Competing claims of sovereign authority over the internet will be an endur-
ing feature of internet lawsuits. Ultimately, this means that courts will have to 
adapt sovereign-deference doctrines to the internet. But before turning to how 
courts might manage competing sovereign claims in this area,
186
 we must con-
sider whether sovereigns are owed deference at all. As a normative matter, what 
is the case for sovereign deference? This Part provides one. It begins by showing 
that the sovereignty concerns raised in cross-border internet disputes are ulti-
mately surmountable: while states may ﬁnd it harder than usual to accomplish 
their aims in the face of foreign internet services, they have powerful tools at 
their disposal to do so. The key governance challenge for the global internet is 
not whether the state can accomplish its goals, but rather ﬁnding ways for states 
to do so that are compatible with a global internet. 
This means two things: accommodating sensible sovereign control over the 
internet and, relatedly, embracing a global internet governance ideal that reﬂects 
sovereign differences. We should not give states reason to assert control by brute 
force—taking physical control over the network architecture in ways that pro-
duce negative externalities. Instead, we should allow sovereigns to enforce their 
laws on their soil wherever doing so does not interfere unreasonably with other 
sovereigns’ regulation of the internet. Accordingly, we must reject the fantasy 
that the internet can or should be governed by the same rules everywhere. Early 
visions of internet governance were insensitive to state interests, but as they 
evolved to accommodate the idea of state regulation over the internet, the anar-
chist dream of an internet free from government rules morphed into a cosmo-
politan dream of an internet with one set of rules for all.
187
 For the global gov-
ernance of the internet, cosmopolitanism is nearly as impractical as anarchy. 
 
186. See infra Part III. 
187. Cf. Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New ‘Digital Divide’: Analyzing the 
Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 119, 128 (2014) (describing the emergence of the “multi-stakeholder model 
of Internet governance” and noting the criticism that model has faced from a “growing array 
of states”). 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
360 
A. What Is Data “Sovereignty”? 
Sovereignty is a notoriously amorphous concept.
188
 Yet, as we have seen, it 
is increasingly invoked in cross-border internet disputes.
189
 What might sover-
eignty mean in this context? Despite the contested nature of the term, nearly all 
deﬁnitions of sovereignty contain the following elements:
190
 (1) supreme con-
trol;
191
 (2) over a territory;
192
 (3) independent from other sovereigns.
193
 These 
features can be mapped onto the concept of a global internet in a number of 
different ways. What will become clear, however, is that without committing too 
deeply to a particular conception of data sovereignty, there is little doubt that 
states have the capacity for sovereign control over the internet. The question—
indeed, a crucial question for internet governance—is how they exert that con-
trol. 
1. Sovereign Capacity 
Do states have supreme control over the data in their territory to the exclu-
sion of other sovereigns? In at least one very real sense, they have the capacity to 
exercise that control. Despite the concerns about state sovereignty mentioned 
above—and despite early internet thinkers’ desires to the contrary
194
—states can 
command considerable control over the internet if only because they control the 
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physical components of the network within their borders.
195
 Today, nearly all 
observers acknowledge that the internet is not a lawless zone. To the contrary, 
states have an impressive arsenal of tools they use to assert control over the in-
ternet, and they are increasingly willing to deploy these tools.
196
 
The most basic means of state control over the internet is physical control 
over the network architecture—the ﬁber, servers, and computers—that com-
prises the internet and that is located within the state’s borders.
197
 This gives the 
state power to censor content,
198
 to monitor online activity,
199
 and to cut a coun-
try’s access to the network entirely.
200
 But physical control over the nodes of the 
network is only the crudest form of state power over the internet, which is also 
facilitated by the market for internet services. This is especially true today as 





—states are able to harness the market and the 
considerable power of corporate intermediaries to accomplish their aims. States 
with lucrative markets can demand that ﬁrms comply with local law as the price 
of admission to those markets. The compliance measures might include giving 
the state physical access to corporate servers—as in China
203
—or access to its 
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domestic bank accounts or employees. And even if states do not have physical 
control over the data itself, they can assert control over the people and property 
that administer access to the data. 
States also respond to threats to their sovereignty by directly or indirectly 
competing in the marketplace with their own homegrown intermediaries, which 
offer alternatives to foreign internet ﬁrms and which might be more cooperative 
with the government. For example, in Russia, Kaspersky Lab is a prominent ﬁrm 
that does signiﬁcant business in the global marketplace for cybersecurity and an-
tivirus services. The Russian government likely has greater leverage over 
Kaspersky than over a foreign ﬁrm, as Kaspersky can be more easily made to 
follow Russian rules and might also be persuaded to do the state’s bidding.
204
 
The same thing has been said of Chinese technology companies, where home-
grown entities like Huawei provide the state with greater access to internal com-




Indeed, if there is any question about whether states can bend the internet to 
local rules, one need only look to China.
206
 In order to do business there, ﬁrms 
face a stark choice: store the physical components of ﬁrm architecture—data cen-
ters, encryption keys—in the country or leave it entirely. Apple, for example, an-
nounced that it would build a Chinese datacenter in accordance with China’s 
data localization law, making that data vulnerable to government authorities.
207
 
Apple promised that there would be “no backdoors” and that Apple would retain 
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However, less than a year later, it announced plans to move the keys to its Chi-
nese iCloud accounts to Chinese territory.
209
 Apple made the move to comply 
with Chinese government demands. Google and Facebook have also begun ef-
forts to comply with Chinese law in order to access the Chinese market,
210
 in 




This is not to say that states will never be frustrated by foreign or even do-
mestic internet companies, or that states do not incur costs when they assert 
control over the internet. Governments can experience enormous political pres-
sure to refrain from exercising their powers online. A judge in Brazil sparked an 
uproar when he ordered local telecommunications carriers to block the popular 
chat service WhatsApp,
212
 and another judge ultimately reversed the order on 
the grounds that it would be unfair to users.
213
 Likewise, when the U.S. govern-
ment asked Apple to provide it with keys to access an encrypted iPhone, protests 
were planned, and public officials urged the FBI to rescind its request.
214
 Never-
theless, in the end, states have the tools necessary to assert control over the in-
ternet—the ﬁnal, absolute control indicative of sovereign power. The question 
for litigants, judges, and policymakers, then, is not whether states can assert their 
power over data, but rather how they might do so. 
 
209. Apple Moves to Store iCloud Keys in China, Raising Human Rights Fears, CNBC (Feb. 24, 2018, 
5:48 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/24/apple-moves-to-store-icloud-keys-in-china 
-raising-human-rights-fears.html [https://perma.cc/TTH5-V23E]. 
210. See Mike Isaac, Facebook Said to Create Censorship Tool to Get Back into China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/technology/facebook-censorship-tool 
-china.html [https://perma.cc/F5KR-VX6X]; Jon Russell, Google Moves into Shenzhen in Lat-
est China Expansion, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 16, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/01/16
/googles-moves-into-shenzhen [https://perma.cc/BHU4-UWX3]. 
211. Ryan Gallagher, Google Plans to Launch Censored Search Engine in China, Leaked Documents 
Reveal, INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018, 4:58 AM), https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/google 
-china-search-engine-censorship [https://perma.cc/C6HV-65S6]. 
212. See Vinod Sreeharsha, WhatsApp Blocked in Brazil as Judge Seeks Data, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/technology/judge-seeking-data-shuts-down
-whatsapp-in-brazil.html [https://perma.cc/7L4G-W2W3]. 
213. Jonathan Watts, Judge Lifts WhatsApp Ban in Brazil After Ruling Block Punished Users Unfairly, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2015, 12:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17 
/brazil-whatsapp-ban-lifted-facebook [https://perma.cc/R2PR-SG9B]. 
214. Matt Hamilton et al. , Apple vs. FBI: Congressman Urges Comey to Drop Demands, ‘Take a Deep 
Breath,’ L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:03 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business 
/technology/la-me-ln-apple-vs-fbi-protests-planned-across-the-nation-over-phone 
-privacy-20160222-story.html [https://perma.cc/TR7V-YAM8]. 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
364 
2. Embracing Data Sovereignty 
We can separate states’ sovereign powers over the internet into two broad 
categories: powers to compel compliance and powers to control the means of com-
pliance. Compelled compliance leaves companies and their users free to design 
and use the internet as they see ﬁt, as long as they comply when the government 
comes knocking. Controlled compliance, on the other hand, means that the state 
tells internet ﬁrms how to operate. This distinction may seem slight—in both 
scenarios, the police get the evidence or the website comes down—but in prac-
tice, there is a considerable difference between the two. 
Regulation by compulsion says the following to users and ﬁrms: give us the 
evidence, or else. It articulates the consequences of refusing to comply, but it 
does not dictate the means. Regulation by control, however, says something else: 
weaken your security protocols in the following ways to allow government access 
to your platform. The difference is in the process that is due. Under compelled 
compliance, law enforcement offers the ﬁrm a choice: comply, or challenge the 
order in court or in the press. State powers of control, by contrast, offer no such 
opportunity. This exercise of power is considerably more insidious, because it 
allows the state to dictate the everyday operation of internet services. 
Suppose that we have a choice between two worlds. In the ﬁrst, Microsoft is 
free to store its data wherever it chooses, and it is also free to comply with lawful 
requests for data when presented with those requests by state governments. In 
the second world, Microsoft is not free to choose where it stores customer data. 
Instead, it must keep data on local drives and allow government agents direct 
access to the data. The second world is considerably worse than the ﬁrst. Mi-
crosoft is much less capable of resisting unlawful exercises of state power; sur-
veillance of customer data is considerably easier—both for local and foreign in-
telligence agencies. This world also requires the ﬁrm to spend considerably more 
money developing bespoke network architecture in each market. These costs—
to autonomy, privacy, and entrepreneurship—are the result of a state asserting 
physical control over a particular piece of internet infrastructure. 
States naturally resort to controlled enforcement powers when compulsion 
does not work. This is why states demand data localization.
215
 Not only is locally 
stored data more helpful for state efforts at surveillance, but it also makes it easier 
for states to assert other sorts of control over intermediaries, for example, by 
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compelling the production of digital evidence
216
 and blocking unwanted inter-
net content.
217
 This exercise of physical control over the network is problematic 
for a number of reasons, including increased costs and privacy concerns.
218
 It 
should be a last resort. When the state acts in accordance with local law over a 
matter properly within its jurisdiction, it ought to be able to accomplish its aims 
without controlling the physical components of the network. In order to achieve 
this end, states should seek to accommodate each other and also to encourage 
ﬁrms to do the same. 
Indeed, some of the worst clashes between governments and intermediaries 
have occurred where states sought to achieve their regulatory aims by compelling 
an intermediary to comply, and the intermediary refused. As mentioned earlier, 
when a Brazilian judge was frustrated with WhatsApp’s inability to respond to 
a demand for evidence in a criminal case, the judge issued an injunction blocking 
the app in Brazil.
219
 This meant that nearly 100 million users were unable to ac-
cess the service.
220
 The injunction was eventually overturned,
221
 but the episode 
threatened to revive a bill that Brazilian legislators considered only a few years 
earlier that required internet ﬁrms to store data in Brazil, giving the state certain 
powers to control compliance.
222
 Similarly, when Indian police sought the ac-
count information of a Facebook user who allegedly posted material that was 
critical of a Hindu god and Facebook resisted, the police raided Facebook’s of-
ﬁces in Mumbai.
223
 That same year, India’s chief telecommunications authority 
publicly ﬂoated the idea of requiring foreign ﬁrms to store data locally, giving 
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In each of these cases, a state government sought to enforce its laws on its 
soil and encountered resistance from an American ﬁrm. After the state’s coercive 
power to compel the foreign intermediary to comply with local law failed, the 
state sought to assert its power by obtaining physical control over the data in 
question. This proved an unfortunate development—and an entirely unneces-
sary one. Had Facebook (which is also the owner of WhatsApp) complied with 
local requests, it might have accommodated the state’s compulsion orders and 
avoided further pressure by the state to seek physical control over its data. In-




In a world, then, where states retain the capacity to control the internet, and 
where a state’s efforts to exercise that control often have spillover effects in an-
other state, judges and policymakers have a choice. They can regulate the inter-
net ex ante in ways that accommodate other sovereign interests by mutual recog-
nition and deference—thereby allowing each state to regulate the internet with 
laws; or they can leave the foreign state to assert its interests by force. We should 
strongly prefer the former. The better regime of internet governance is one 
where users and providers are free to comply with state rules however they 
choose. This requires that states recognize other states’ legitimate interests and 
provide mutual accommodation. This idea is rooted in longstanding notions of 
international relations, but it is also an idea deeply at odds with the dominant 
cosmopolitan ideal of internet governance. 
B. Embracing Sovereign Differences 
If the early debates about internet governance were about whether states had 
the power to regulate internet conduct, today’s debates (as we have seen) are 
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about which states’ rules should apply and where. There are, generally speaking, 
two competing visions of internet governance today: (1) a cosmopolitan ideal that 
aspires to one set of rules everywhere, which is diametrically opposed to (2) a 
sovereign-difference ideal that sees the internet operating differently in different 
places according to local norms, customs, and rules. The cosmopolitan ideal is 
grounded in the idea that the internet should be “free”
226
—an adjective that sig-
nals the wish that internet providers and users be at liberty to ignore local rules 
and operate instead by their own set of global internet rules.
227
 The chief propo-
nent of the cosmopolitan view is the United States, which has pursued an “open 
internet” policy for the past decade.
228
 The animating conception is of the inter-
net as a cosmopolis—a space that, if regulated by governments, should operate 
the same everywhere as “one internet.”
229
 This can be achieved through the uni-
versal imposition of a single set of rules. 
But whose rules? Without saying as much, the answer is often implicitly 
“American rules.”
230
 For example, American providers—and the vast majority of 
the most popular web services in most countries are American
231
 —embrace 
American free speech norms.
232
 This reﬂects both the internal values of the 
members of the ﬁrm and the power of the U.S. government over the biggest 
internet ﬁrms.
233
 As a result, these ﬁrms regularly resist foreign government ef-
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forts to impose their own domestic speech rules.
234
 These efforts, and the sub-
sequent resistance, suggest one reason why other governments seek to establish 
strong domestic internet industries with ﬁrms that would be both more pliable 
at home and exert more soft inﬂuence abroad.
235
 
The sovereign-difference ideal, by contrast, is concerned principally with 
state control over the internet’s local effects. It places a premium on the standard 
components of sovereignty: state control over a territory. If the internet threat-
ens the state’s ability to achieve its domestic aims, or if it invites foreign med-
dlers, the sovereigntists see a global internet framework that respects difference, 
and respects state efforts to protect that difference. 
These two conceptions of internet governance do not exist independent of 
each other. They are reactions to one another and reﬂect larger geopolitical strug-
gles. The strong sovereignty approach to internet policy is a reaction to the sense 
non-Western states have that the internet rules are being written by Western 
states. Sovereigntists see the cosmopolitan ideal as a farce: under their view, it is 
American imperialism masquerading as globalism.
236
 Cosmopolitans, for their 
part, accuse sovereigntists of trying to break apart the internet.
237
 They often 
frame the debate as over whether the internet should be “open” or “balkan-
ized.”
238
 But this framing is wrong for two reasons. First, the internet can be 
both. It can be uniform in many respects but also different where it needs to be 
(language, legal compliance, and so on). One does not lose openness—or inter-
operability—by embracing sovereign differences. The second reason this dichot-
omy is unhelpful is that fragmentation is already here. It is happening because 
states want it, because users want it, and because ﬁrms want it. The question is 
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not “should the internet fragment,” but rather what kind of fragmentation 
should we encourage? The answer has to be the kind of fragmentation that al-
lows maximal sovereign difference with minimal harm to other sovereigns. The 
answer, in other words, is the kind of fragmentation that is possible by state-to-
state negotiation and mutual accommodation. 
There are three principal objections to a sovereign-difference approach to 
internet governance. First, proponents of the cosmopolitan ideal of internet gov-
ernance claim that their vision for the internet enhances privacy, speech, and en-
trepreneurship. But if generalizations are to be made about the two ideals, then 
it is precisely the other way around: deference to state differences is a necessary 
ﬁrst step toward an internet-governance regime grounded in the rule of law ra-
ther than of technologies. Insisting that states follow American rules—or telling 
states that their rules are not applicable to the internet—is the surest way to en-
courage state control of technology rather than of law. Despite considerable ef-
forts at supranational political organizations, states remain the single greatest 
source of legitimate rules for different peoples with varied community values and 
experiences on a diverse planet.
239
 As a space for human communication and 
connection, the internet will and should reﬂect those differences. Cosmopolitans 
may pay lip service to this idea, but the reality is that cosmopolitan companies 
regularly resist state efforts to enforce their laws.
240
 
Another natural objection to any argument for sovereign deference on the 
internet is that it is tantamount to splintering the internet into as many distinct 
networks as there are countries. But this argument tends to ignore political real-
ity. Even if one is not persuaded by normative arguments about the legitimacy 
of a state’s rules over conduct on its soil, the fact of the matter is that states will 
always insist—with brute force if necessary—that their rules apply. If the above 
estimation of state power over the physical components of the internet is correct, 
then some regional variation is inevitable. In such a world, the question is not 
whether there will be differences in how the internet behaves in different states, 
but rather how those differences will occur: by compulsion or by control? If we 
are to hope that states will achieve their aims without asserting physical control 
over servers and ﬁber cables, then states must be left free—and must leave each 
other free—to control how the internet operates on their territory. Indeed, we 
already operate in a world of sovereign deference for the regulation of nearly 
everything else—money, debt, securities, people, and goods—that ﬂows across 
 
239. See Stephen D. Krasner, Think Again: Sovereignty, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 20, 2009, 3:28 PM), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/20/think-again-sovereignty [https://perma.cc/N4GW 
-EHA3]. 
240. Rozenshtein, supra note 28, at 122-149 (describing and cataloguing internet ﬁrms’ techniques 
of resisting state compliance efforts). 
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borders. Unless a state has explicitly granted a waiver of its own rules by agree-
ment, sovereign deference is the rule rather than the exception. Why would we 
think that data, and the ﬁrms that handle that data, should be treated any differ-
ently? 
The problem with the goal of a single set of rules for the internet is that it 
always redounds to the same question: whose rules will they be? In a world 
where the vast majority of the most popular internet services in most countries 
are American,
241
 and the body responsible for governing the internet’s architec-
ture is widely perceived to be American,
242
 the answer has long been that mostly 
American rules apply.
243
 To a certain extent, then, rejecting internet globalism is 
rejecting American internet imperialism. 
A ﬁnal objection one might have to sovereignty arguments is that they serve 
as an apology for bad state behavior. Even if the strong sovereignty approach 
more accurately reﬂects political reality, cosmopolitans may also appeal to em-
pirical evidence. Because the states that have pursued sovereign visions of the 
internet have so far largely been able to achieve their aims by exerting control 
over the technology, one might hesitate to embrace regional differences if doing 
so is a mere cover for state crackdowns on users.
244
 But this is a mistake. The 
two issues—the global internet governance model and the state’s use of power—
are distinct. Embracing regional or state differences does not mean sacriﬁcing 
human rights. One can accept sovereign differences—such as France’s hate 
speech rules applied to Twitter in France, even where they contravene the First 
Amendment—without acquiescing to a future where every country behaves as 
China does, insisting on local storage of cloud architecture and direct, unmedi-
ated physical access and control over internet data. Indeed, one can defend 
China’s sovereign interest in regulating the internet’s domestic effects while de-
ploring its civil and political rights record. In a world of inevitable sovereign 
control, a world of inevitable sovereign differences, sovereign deference is the 
best way forward. But deference does not mean endorsement or celebration. We 
 
241. See Woods, supra note 15, at 741. 
242. Maria Farrell, Quietly, Symbolically, U.S. Control of the Internet Was Just Ended, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/14/icann-internet-control 
-domain-names-iana [https://perma.cc/7JTY-W9W6] (explaining how ICANN, the Inter-
net Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which is responsible for running the in-
ternet’s naming and numbering systems, such as domain names, had long been perceived as 
American controlled). 
243. See Kerr, supra note 15, at 287. 
244. MUELLER, supra note 238, at 106 (“[Alignment] empowers repressive governments and pro-
tectionist interests by insulating people from access to information environments outside their 
own country.”). 
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can, and we should, embrace the idea of state differences without embracing the 
idea of a state-run internet or a state-controlled internet. 
C. The Case for Sovereign Deference 
The most compelling defense of sovereign deference in cross-border data 
disputes is that it offers the best chance at creating the kinds of norms needed 
for a lasting and global internet. Sovereign states retain the capacity to regulate 
and control the internet, and they are going to exercise that control differently. 
The key question, then, is the shape these disparate exercises of sovereign power 
are going to take. Do states accomplish this fragmentation by force, or through 
negotiation—explicit or implicit—among international partners? Sovereign-
deference doctrines offer a sensible guidepost for the latter path. We might im-
agine that deferring to other states’ interests is in every state’s best interest when 
it might lead to reciprocal treatment. Rather than ask what is right or wrong in 
another state, deference doctrines allow courts to treat coequal sovereigns as 
such. They allow courts to defer to the better judgment of the sovereign without 
actually judging whether it is better. This in turn may encourage reciprocity from 
the courts of foreign sovereigns.
245
 We might also add here an antiexceptional-
ism argument: data is just another globally distributed good, and as such its 
treatment by sovereigns and among sovereigns should abide by the usual rules 
of foreign affairs and international law.
246
 In the ﬁnal analysis, if we choose in-
difference to deference, and allow ideals of internet cosmopolitanism to cloud 
our thinking, then states will eventually assert their sovereign differences any-
way, and through worse means. Very simply, the case for sovereign deference is 
that it represents the best possible hope for global governance of the internet. 
i i i .  the sovereign-deference doctrines 
Global internet activity creates a cross-jurisdictional problem: devising a set 
of rules that accommodates the overlapping and sometimes competing interests 
of different states in regulating internet conduct. At some level, this challenge is 
not a new one.
247
 Since the founding of the Republic, American courts have been 
 
245. Kramer, supra note 148, at 340-41. 
246. Woods, supra note 15, at 756-63. 
247. Id. at 764. 
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sensitive to the foreign affairs implications of their actions.
248
 Indeed, the Fram-
ers were acutely aware of this problem and took several steps to address it.
249
 
Perhaps nothing in American legal jurisprudence captures this idea better than 






Comity is an ill-deﬁned
252
 but fundamental concept in American foreign re-
lations law.
253
 It can be broadly understood as a jurisprudential principle holding 
that courts should acknowledge and in some cases defer to the legitimate sover-
eignty interests of other states.
254
 While comity is often referred to as “interna-
tional comity”—to distinguish it from comity among U.S. states—it is a creature 
of domestic law.
255
 Comity is “a sort of intercourt diplomacy long assumed to be 
within courts’ constitutional competence.”
256
 As William Dodge notes, it can be 
deﬁned simply as: “deference to foreign government actors that is not required 
by international law but is incorporated in domestic law.”
257
 Importantly, defer-




Comity is a judicial principle for encouraging cooperation among sover-
eigns.
259
 There may be reasons for states not to defer to one another on certain 
 
248. See, e.g., Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empir-
ical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855 (2005) (showing that a considerable 
portion of the early Court’s docket was taken up with foreign affairs concerns). 
249. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 4. 
250. Posner and Sunstein, for example, discuss “international relations doctrines,” which they di-
vide into “comity doctrines” and “anti-comity doctrines.” Posner & Sunstein, supra note 14, 
at 1173-82. 
251. Id. 
252. Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893 (1998) (“‘In-
ternational comity’ is frequently invoked by courts but rarely deﬁned with precision.”); see 
also William Dodge, supra note 14, at 2073-75 (summarizing the widely held view that the term 
lacks precise deﬁnition). 
253. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 4. 
254. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 2078. 
255. Id. 
256. Bookman, supra note 13, at 1096. 
257. Dodge, supra note 14, at 2078 (emphasis omitted). 
258. Id. at 2078-79; see also Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 
392-93 (2017) (modifying Dodge’s categories slightly and emphasizing positive and negative 
kinds of comity). 
259. Cf. Kramer, supra note 148, at 340 (proposing canons “designed to capture . . . potential gains 
from cooperation” in the context of conﬂicts of laws between U.S. states). 
litigating data sovereignty 
373 
issues or at particular moments in time, but over the long run, with repeat inter-
actions, states are better off if they agree as a general matter not to meddle in 
each others’ affairs.
260
 For this reason, comity doctrines have a rich history in the 
United States and abroad. They have developed in light of interactions between 
different countries’ legal systems. For example, in one of Canada’s leading com-
ity cases, the Canadian Supreme Court relied on an early American comity case, 
Hilton v. Guyot,
261
 to deﬁne the doctrine: “‘Comity’ in the legal sense, is neither 
a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good 
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its 
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation.”
262
 
Of course, to defer to foreign state interests, courts must take notice of them. 
This requires a brief examination of what counts as a legitimate state interest and 
how courts take notice of that interest. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States gives ﬁve classic bases for prescriptive jurisdic-
tion.
263
 Each of these is a ground for a state legitimately to pass a law or regula-
tion, and together they provide insight into what courts have deemed to be le-
gitimate state interests. States may legitimately prescribe law with respect to: (1) 
conduct that occurs within the state’s territorial borders; (2) persons or things 
on the state’s territory; (3) extraterritorial conduct that is intended to have or 
has substantial effects within the state’s territory; (4) conduct of the state’s na-
tionals, at home and abroad; and (5) extraterritorial conduct that threatens the 
state’s security or national interests.
264
 Elsewhere, I have suggested how these 
ﬁve bases of jurisdiction apply to cloud services.
265
 
Two of these bases are most relevant to the present discussion, as they are 
the primary bases for the conﬂicts described in Part I. Those conﬂicts arise where 
a court is hoping to protect one of its citizens and fashions an extraterritorial 
remedy in order to do so, as in Equustek.
266
 They also arise where there is some 
extraterritorial conduct that falls within whatever territory the court happens to 
 
260. Id. 
261. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
262. Spencer v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, 283 (Can.) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64). 
263. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
264. Id. 
265. Woods, supra note 15, at 764-69. 
266. Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.). 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
374 
sit in, as in Microsoft Ireland.
267
 Notice that these categories reﬂect the state’s in-
terest—and this is echoed in longstanding American legal jurisprudence
268
—in 
conduct that has effects on the state, wherever that conduct occurs. The state will 
seek to provide remedies that maximally satisfy that interest, including extrater-
ritorially. In the cloud context, this means that judges have a set of tools for man-
aging and crafting cross-border data policy. Comity can be used for restraint—
to refrain from stepping on another state’s toes—but also for recognition—to 
recognize another nation’s interest in a matter and extend that state’s authority 
beyond its borders. 
A. Restraint 
One consequential form that comity takes is a set of doctrines of restraint.
269
 
With regard to production orders,
270
 compulsion to testify,
271
 and other poten-
tial cross-border conﬂict, international comity often calls for a weighing of state 
interests. As the Second Circuit noted, “a court of one country should make an 
effort to minimize possible conﬂict between its orders and the law of a foreign 
state affected by its decision.”
272
 Once a foreign sovereign interest is identiﬁed, 
courts have some discretion about how to refrain from interfering in that inter-
est.
273
 This might manifest itself in a number of different domains. 
1. Remedies 
One way that courts refrain from interfering with another state’s sovereignty 
is by limiting the reach of the remedies they provide. For example, suppose that 
a court seeks to fashion a remedy—say an injunction—in a case where someone 
 
267. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Con-
trolled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 855 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2017). 
268. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (articulating an “effects” test for personal juris-
diction cases). 
269. Dodge, supra note 14, at 2076. 
270. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that extraterritorial 
discovery orders were not inconsistent with comity where the balance of state interests 
weighed in favor of evidence production). 
271. See, e.g., United States v. Field (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 532 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 
1976) (embracing the “Restatement position” to balance the interests of the United States 
with those of the Cayman Islands, where a noncitizen was compelled to testify before a U.S. 
grand jury and such production would violate Caymanian bank secrecy laws). 
272. United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968). 
273. Id. 
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claims a harm that can only be fully extinguished by a global injunction. The 
court must decide not only the appropriate remedy, but also its reach. In Google 
Spain, the court concluded that it had the authority to order Google to delist 
private information from Google’s search results, not only in Google’s Spanish 
country domain (google.es), but also in its home domain (google.com).
274
 A 
similar issue is now pending before the CJEU.
275
 Equustek is the same story.
276
 
Google disputed neither Canada’s authority to hear the case, nor its authority to 
issue appropriate remedies, including an injunction to remove internet content. 
Rather, Google challenged the territorial reach of the court’s remedy.
277
 Recall 
that in this case, Google produced search results that included links to a page 
selling Datalink’s illegal product, harming a Canadian corporation.
278
 The ap-
propriate remedy was simple enough: the court ordered Google to delist any 
links to the offending pages.
279
 But where? 
What matters, in terms of comity, is that courts restrain themselves from in-
terfering with the legitimate interests of other states. That typically requires 
some limiting principle to guide the remedies that courts deploy. In the internet 
governance context, we can imagine three types of remedy. Comity will require 
a limiting principle to each one, regardless of the remedy’s scope. 
 
1.  Domain-Limited Remedy: The court issues an injunction ordering the 
service provider to remove the offending material from its Canadian do-
main (google.ca), but not its other domains. This would allow someone 
sitting in Canada to ﬁnd the material by visiting google.com. The limit-
ing principle is country domain. 
2.  Location-Limited Remedy: The court issues an injunction ordering the 
service provider to ﬁlter out users located in Canada, and remove any 
offending material for those users, regardless of which Google domain 
they visit (google.ca or google.com). The limiting principle is user loca-
tion. 
3.  Comity-Limited Remedy: The court issues a global injunction, requiring 
Google to remove the offending material across all of its domains and 
for all users, wherever they are located, except where doing so would 
 
274. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&docid=152065 
[https://perma.cc/Q694-URG7]. 
275. Scott, supra note 10. 
276. Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions, Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824 (Can.). 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 825. 
279. Id. at 826. 
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conﬂict with the laws or interests of other states. The limiting principle 
is conﬂict with other nations’ interests. 
 
The ﬁrst remedy is the least satisfactory because it does not accomplish what 
the court seeks: to protect the rights of Equustek by not allowing Datalink to sell 
its infringing products, especially in Canada. Suppose that a user in Canada 
hoped to buy one of the Datalink products. All she would need to do is visit 
www.google.com from her computer in Canada.
280
 This is not an effective solu-
tion from the standpoint of remedying the harm posed to Equustek, the Cana-
dian ﬁrm. 
A location-based remedy is preferable to a domain-speciﬁc remedy because 
the state’s core interest is ensuring that whatever rules it adopts are enforced 
within its territory.
281
 Under this approach, the service provider takes steps to 
identify the location of its users and to deliver a product that complies with the 
law where the user is located.
282
 One standard critique of such a system is that 
the ﬁrm might struggle to identify its users’ locations.
283
 However, it is fairly 
easy for internet ﬁrms accurately to locate the vast majority of their users.
284
 In-
deed, much internet advertising is location-based, suggesting that it can be done 
successfully. After all, location-based advertising would not have much value if 
the locations were all wrong.
285
 Another possible critique of a location-based 
remedy is that it, too, can be evaded. To be sure, determined internet users can 
deploy virtual private networks and other anonymization tools that circumvent 
the ﬁrm’s system for identifying user location.
286
 And while a relatively small 
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(Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.adweek.com/digital/are-marketers-ﬁnally-getting-hang 
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portion of internet users actually use such tools,
287
 these are precisely the users 
that a ﬁrm might legitimately be worried about. But this is not an insurmount-
able problem: internet ﬁrms have tools to combat location masking, and they 
regularly use these tools in order to comply with licensing arrangements for mu-
sic, books, and movies.
288
 
When France and Spain asked Google to take down search results in accord-
ance with the Right to be Forgotten, Google initially resisted.
289
 After losing the 
jurisdictional argument in court, the ﬁrm offered the ﬁrst remedy: it agreed to 
take down the material at issue only on the country-speciﬁc domains (Google.es 
and Google.fr).
290
 This did not satisfy the data authorities,
291
 and after some 
back-and-forth, Google relented.
292
 Today, in order to comply more fully with 
the French and Spanish regulations regarding the Right to be Forgotten, Google 
deploys a user-location based product in Europe. That is, Google geo-blocks the 
material that users have requested be delisted, but only for users located in Eu-
rope. This, however, did not satisfy the French data authorities, who referred the 
matter to Europe’s top court to decide whether Google must instead implement 
the third remedy, a global takedown.
293
 
The state, naturally, may prefer the third remedy if it maximally protects its 
interests. If Canada attempts to secure the interests of a Canadian citizen by pre-
scribing certain conduct, then it has a recognized interest in prescribing that con-
duct everywhere.
294
 As the Equustek court explained: 
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Where it is necessary to ensure the injunction’s effectiveness, a court can 
grant an injunction enjoining conduct anywhere in the world. The prob-
lem in this case is occurring online and globally. The Internet has no bor-
ders—its natural habitat is global. The only way to ensure that the inter-




But can Canadian courts ensure the enforcement of their injunctions elsewhere? 
Certainly not. That depends on how comity principles are deployed in the forum 
state where the injunction is challenged. As we will see, global injunctions are 
not necessarily inconsistent with comity.
296
 The point is that even with the cross-
border cloud, courts can fashion cross-border remedies that contain built-in re-
straints. They have wide latitude in fashioning these remedies, and they often 
will do so with an eye toward other sovereigns, or they will not but the remedy 
will nonetheless be limited unilaterally by that sovereign. 
2. Production Orders 
Microsoft Ireland
297
—like several cases since
298
—is fundamentally about the 
reach of production orders across borders. Here, law enforcement agents seek 
access to data stored overseas and obtain a production order, like a subpoena, 
2703(d) order, search warrant, or some other kind of legal process.
299
 The ques-
tion is then whether the order compels the production of foreign-held data. 
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296. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 482(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
297. Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Con-
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Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757(GMH), 2017 WL 2480752 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); 
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Comity could limit the way that such orders operate by asking a court to 
consider the possibility that a production order implicates another state’s inter-
est in the data not being produced.
300
 So far, comity has played a relatively small 
role in the court battles over digital production. Only one brief in the Microsoft 
Ireland case called attention to the issue.
301
 Because the court decision turned on 
statutory interpretation and the court’s use of the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality, it did not need to address the comity argument explicitly. 
But it could have. Indeed, it would not be surprising to see a court use comity 
to resolve a dispute about the reach of a cross-border production order. If a mag-
istrate judge issued an ECPA order
302
 that compelled a provider to deliver infor-
mation that plainly violated the laws of another country, a federal judge might 
be open to modifying the order so as to avoid the conﬂict of laws. In Linde v. Arab 
Bank,
303
 the Second Circuit acknowledged that production orders can be cur-
tailed out of a concern for international sovereign interests
304
:  
We observe that when weighing the conﬂicting legal obligations of U.S. 
discovery orders and foreign laws, “[m]echanical or overbroad rules of 
thumb are of little value; what is required is a careful balancing of the 
interests involved and a precise understanding of the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case.”
305
  
This balancing of interests is not simply an inquiry into whether the judicial ac-
tion in question creates a conﬂict of laws or puts a party at risk of foreign criminal 
sanctions.
306
 Rather, the inquiry requires weighing “(on the one hand) the in-
terests of foreign governments in enforcing their laws and the potential hardship 
[on the burdened party],”
307
 against “(on the other hand) the interests of the 
 
300. This is essentially the argument Apple made in its amicus brief, although it did not identify a 
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303. 706 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013). 
304. Id. at 108. 
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ternational comity.”). 
307. Id. at 98. 
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Courts conduct this balancing test with reference to ﬁve factors:
309
 
[T]he importance to the . . . litigation of the documents or other infor-
mation requested; the degree of speciﬁcity of the request; whether the 
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative 
means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncompli-
ance with the request would undermine important interests of the 
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine im-
portant interests of the state where the information is located.
310
 
The court in Linde ultimately concluded that the order did not offend inter-
national comity because comity requires not absolute deference, but rather re-
spect and a balancing of national interests.
311
 There is often room in comity an-
alysis for permission seeking.
312
 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States notes that “a court or agency in the United States may 
require the person to whom the order is directed to make a good faith effort to 
secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information avail-
able.”
313
 We could imagine, then, in the cloud context, that courts would be 
skeptical of claims by companies that cross-border production orders were likely 
to harm foreign government interests, where those service providers did not 
make a good-faith effort to ask permission from the relevant state ﬁrst. 
3. Statutory Interpretation 
Another way courts refrain from interfering with another sovereign’s au-
thority is by interpreting vague laws in ways that do not offend comity.
314
 For 
example, the Charming Betsy canon of construction—by which courts interpret 
 
308. Id. 
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987). 
310. Id. § 442(1)(c). 
311. 706 F.3d at 111. 
312. Id. at 99. 
313. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442(2)(a) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
314. See Edward T. Swaine, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States, in COOPERA-
TION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 13 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court is receptive to comity when presented as a tool for statutory construction.”). 
litigating data sovereignty 
381 
ambiguous statutes in ways that do not violate international law
315
—is one ex-
ample of an interpretive rule that operates as a form of prescriptive comity.
316
 So 
an internet service provider served with an order to produce emails stored 
abroad, issued under a statute like the SCA, might argue that doing so would 
contravene the territorial sovereignty of another state, and that is a violation of 
traditional notions of territorial sovereignty under international law.
317
 Indeed, 
Microsoft made precisely this argument before the Second Circuit, noting: “The 
imperative to preserve the territorial integrity of foreign nations is so strong that 
it provides an independent basis on which to invalidate the Warrant.”
318
 This 
argument may or may not be convincing as a matter of international law—the 
customary international law regarding cross-border internet activity is unset-
tled—but the point of the canon is clear. Rather than argue for a particular inter-
pretation of the statutory presumption in favor of or against extraterritorial ap-
plication, the Charming Betsy canon asks courts to ﬁnd ways of interpreting 
vague statutes in ways that do not violate international law. 
B. Recognition 
Comity can also mean more than restraint and may instead involve active 
recognition and outright enforcement of the interests of another state. This can 
take a number of different forms. 
 
315. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . . .”). 
316. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) 
(identifying the Charming Betsy rule of construction as deriving from a principle of “prescrip-
tive comity”). But see Dodge, supra note 14, at 2076 n.37 (noting that “the Charming Betsy 
canon . . . is not really a comity doctrine”). 
317. See Brief for Appellant, supra note 150, at 33-35. 
318. Id. at 34. 
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1. Enforcement of Judgments 
American courts regularly recognize the court judgments of a foreign sover-
eign,
319
 but not always. There is no federal statute that requires courts to recog-
nize foreign judgments,
320
 so the determination typically depends on the state 
law relevant to the case.
321
 Enforcing foreign judgments is something courts do 
out of a sense of comity,
322




Consider two examples. When a French court held that Yahoo! had to re-
move Nazi memorabilia from its French pages, Yahoo! brought suit in a U.S. 
court, asking the court whether it would enforce the French judgment.
324
 The 
court, in order to determine whether to enforce the order, looked “to general 
principles of comity followed by the California courts.”
325
 Google took a similar 
step in its dispute with Equustek over the global injunction issued.
326
 It asked a 
court to determine preemptively that Equustek would not be able to enforce the 
injunction granted a month earlier by the Canadian Supreme Court, on the 
grounds that the injunction would violate international comity.
327
 Much like the 
Yahoo! litigation, this case has an odd posture: Google is relying on comity—a 
doctrine of deference to foreign sovereigns—in order to justify not deferring to 
the judgment of a foreign sovereign.
328
 It would be more consistent with the 
 
319. See, e.g., Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2004); Ingersoll Mill-
ing Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987). But see Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 
F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995) (choosing not to enforce a libel judgment from the United Kingdom 
on the grounds that doing so would contravene free speech policy in the United States); 
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (same). 
320. See FOREIGN JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION & ENF’T ACT (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 
2005). 
321. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1213 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (“In a typical enforcement case, the party in whose favor the 
foreign judgment was granted comes to an American court affirmatively seeking enforcement. 
The standard rule in such a case is that the federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of 
the state in which it sits.”). 
322. Dodge, supra note 14, at 2072. 
323. See id. at 2125-27. 
324. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1212-13. 
325. Id. at 1213. 
326. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 5-6, 12. 
327. Id. 
328. See Andrew Keane Woods, Google Takes the Global Delisting Debate to a U.S. Court, LAWFARE 
(July 27, 2017, 2:28 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/google-takes-global-delisting-debate-us 
-court [https://perma.cc/Z4US-765H]. 
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logic of comity for Equustek to ask a U.S. court to ﬁnd that comity calls for rec-
ognizing and enforcing the Canadian injunction.
329
 
We might imagine the same thing occurring in other contexts, too. For ex-
ample, suppose that a Brazilian court demands that an American intermediary 
produce customer data as part of a civil lawsuit, and the ﬁrm refuses to com-
ply.
330
 Brazil might make an application to a U.S. court to enforce the judgment, 
and comity would counsel the court to take a serious look at the order and con-
sider whether to recognize and enforce it.
331
 
2. Sovereign Compulsion 
The sovereign-compulsion doctrine—perhaps best known in antitrust 
law
332
—is another doctrinal tool for courts to recognize sovereign interests, al-
beit indirectly. Under the doctrine, courts “have discretion to excuse violations 
of U.S. law, or moderate the sanctions imposed for such violations, on the 
ground that the violations are compelled by another state’s law,” where the party 
in question would suffer severe consequences if they did not comply with the 
foreign law and where they acted in good faith to avoid the conﬂict.
333
 In Inter-
american Reﬁning Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., a federal district court accepted 
the defendants’ argument that foreign law—in this case Venezuelan law—pro-
hibited them from delivering oil to the plaintiff, thereby releasing the defendants 
of liability.
334
 The logic of the foreign-state compulsion doctrine extends to any 
number of internet disputes. Suppose, for example, that Brazil forces Google to 
 
329. Id. 
330. Brazil detained a Microsoft executive for exactly that. Brad Smith, In the Cloud We Trust, MI-
CROSOFT, https://news.microsoft.com/stories/inthecloudwetrust [https://perma.cc/RY8Z 
-2MY7]. 
331. This hypothetical is a civil lawsuit, but we might imagine comity principles similarly inform-
ing a country’s implementation of an MLAT in order to render assistance in a criminal inves-
tigation. Further, there is some evidence that the so-called public law taboo is eroding in for-
eign affairs law. See William S. Dodge, Jurisdiction in the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations 
Law, 18 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 143, 167-68 (2017). 
332. See Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging 
the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 130, 138 (1982) (noting that the 
sovereign compulsion doctrine “insulates parties from liability under the antitrust laws when 
the challenged activity was compelled or required by a foreign government”). 
333. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 222 (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016). 
334. 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (D. Del. 1970). 
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produce data in violation of ECPA. The sovereign-compulsion doctrine could 
relieve Google of liability.
335
 
C. Encouraging Comity 
Deference to foreign sovereigns largely stems from a recognition that states 
are part of an international system that depends in part on noninterference and 
mutual respect.
336
 Comity is not only a consequence of that fact but also a cause. 
Accordingly, courts take a number of steps to actively encourage comity. 
1. Resisting Blocking Statutes 
Blocking statutes, which prohibit compliance with another country’s laws, 
might be considered anticomity statutes.
337
 For this reason, they are often not 
given the same deference as other statutes, and courts have developed antiblock-
ing-statute norms. For example, courts that typically defer to state interests may 
decline to do so where that state has passed blocking laws deliberately in order 
to frustrate extraterritorial orders.
338
 As the Supreme Court found in Société Na-
tionale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court,
339
 blocking statutes 
are not due the same deference as other substantive rules.
340
 The Court noted: 
The lesson of comity is that neither the discovery order nor the blocking 
statute can have the same omnipresent effect that it would have in a 
world of only one sovereign. The blocking statute thus is relevant to the 
court’s particularized comity analysis only to the extent that its terms and 
 
335. The ﬂipside of this, as we will see, is that states sometimes refuse to grant another state the 
beneﬁt of comity where that state has adopted a blocking statute. ECPA is one such statute. 
336. Dodge, supra note 14, at 2085-86 (describing comity’s intellectual roots and noting that sov-
ereign deference is essential for the Westphalian system, which is made up of states whose 
sovereignty depends in part on noninterference in each other’s affairs). 
337. Posner and Sunstein catalog a series of anticomity doctrines—doctrines that privilege paro-
chial interests at the expense of foreign-state interests. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 14, at 
1182 (“[A]nti-comity doctrines assert American interests in the context of international rela-
tions, potentially or actually at the expense of the interests of other countries.”). 
338. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 re-
porters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Blocking statutes are designed to take advantage of 
the foreign government compulsion defense by prohibiting the disclosure, copying, inspec-
tion, or removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with 
orders of foreign authorities.” (citation omitted)). 
339. 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
340. Id. at 539-40, 544 n.29. 
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its enforcement identify the nature of the sovereign interests in nondis-
closure of speciﬁc kinds of material.
341
 
The logic of not deferring to foreign blocking statutes in a regime that otherwise 
recognizes and defers to foreign interests is consistent with encouraging comity. 
Courts seek to make room for legitimate foreign interests and hope foreign 
courts will do the same, but not where legislatures have attempted to take ad-
vantage of comity rules.
342
 It could have considerable effects on cross-border in-
ternet disputes for courts to ignore blocking statutes—especially given the sig-




The idea of comity is rooted, at some level, in reciprocity and mutual accom-
modation.
344
 Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Aérospatiale, noted that 
“[c]omity is not just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation 
when it is in our interest to do so. Rather it is a principle under which judicial 
decisions reﬂect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.”
345
 That 
is, courts are mindful of the fact that their orders do not occur in a vacuum and 
that they are taken seriously by the courts of other countries. “The lesson of com-
ity,” the Court said in Aérospatiale, “is that neither the discovery order nor the 
blocking statute can have the same omnipresent effect that it would have in a 
world of only one sovereign.”
346
 
Courts can elect to recognize and defer to foreign interests to the extent that 
another state is willing to do the same.
347




341. Id. at 545. 
342. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 report-
ers’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“[Blocking statutes] need not be given the same deference 
by courts of the United States as differences in substantive rules of law.”). 
343. See Woods, supra note 15, at 779. 
344. See Gardner, supra note 258, at 392-93. 
345. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 555 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
346. Id. at 545 n.29 (majority opinion). 
347. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 2081 n.49. 
348. John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1109, 1169 (2014) (“If a policy 
of judgments reciprocity is unlikely to persuade the nations that currently refuse to enforce 
U.S. judgments to change their practice—as seems to be the case—then the answer to the 
question of whether to adopt such a policy is easy.”). 
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and reciprocity is uncommon with respect to the enforcement of foreign judg-
ments.
349
 But the practice has a long pedigree.
350
 It may especially make sense in 
the cloud context, where each state is attempting to design novel and sometimes 
comprehensive internet regulations. This is precisely the idea behind the pro-
posed U.S.-U.K. agreement, the ﬁrst of many such agreements provided for by 
the CLOUD Act. It grants law enforcement access to those countries that strike 
a deal with the United States, on the theory that such a deal will grant reciprocal 
law enforcement access to data held abroad.
351
 Reciprocity may or may not be 
seen as comity-enhancing depending on the circumstances. In the case of ECPA, 
which acts as a blocking statute preventing most states from being able to compel 
American providers to produce evidence, a reciprocity requirement shows less 
deference to other sovereigns than merely removing the blocking statute alto-
gether. In other contexts, though, we could imagine reciprocal increases in sov-
ereign deference playing a crucial role. Indeed, this is part of the motivation for 
PPD-28, which guarantees similar baseline privacy protections for citizens and 
noncitizens alike.
352
 Privacy Shield is built on a foundation of reciprocal privacy 
protections, and without that reciprocity, it would likely fail.
353
 
iv.  what sovereign deference does not preclude 
Comity does sometimes counsel against extraterritoriality. It can be used by 
states to refrain from extending a ruling that interferes with another state’s in-
terests. But sometimes it cuts exactly the other way and calls for courts to give a 
foreign court’s orders extraterritorial reach.
354
 When a court issues a ruling with 
 
349. See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURIS-
DICTION § 404 reporters’ note 11 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2014). 
350. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 2081 n.49 (noting a century-old reciprocity rule for the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments). 
351. Jennifer Daskal & Andrew Keane Woods, Congress Should Embrace the DOJ’s Cross-Border Data 
Fix, LAWFARE (Aug. 1, 2016, 8:52 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-should 
-embrace-dojs-cross-border-data-ﬁx-0 [https://perma.cc/7Z3S-32DG]. 
352. Press Release, White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities § 4 
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17 
/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [https://perma.cc/S93P 
-GHCE]. 
353. See Cobun Keegan, Calm Down: Trump Hasn’t Tanked Privacy Shield Just Yet, IAPP: PRIVACY 
TRACKER (Jan. 27, 2017), http://iapp.org/news/a/calm-down-trump-hasnt-tanked-privacy 
-shield-just-yet [https://perma.cc/LJT4-J7HQ]. 
354. See Cameron Kerry & Alan Charles Raul, The Economic Case for Preserving PPD-28 and Privacy 
Shield, LAWFARE (Jan. 17, 2017, 3:19PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/economic-case 
-preserving-ppd-28-and-privacy-shield [https://perma.cc/2VC6-5LCE]. 
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effects in another state, the aggrieved party will often ask the other state to en-
force the ruling. Courts recognize and enforce foreign judgments—giving them 
extraterritorial bite—in the name of comity. In other words, courts recognize that 
state interests extend beyond borders. 
A. Extraterritorial Production Orders 
Not all exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction are incompatible with foreign 
sovereign interests. Even where they are in tension, courts need not defer com-
pletely to the foreign sovereign interest if it is outweighed by the domestic inter-
est.
355
 This is not reﬂected in the brieﬁng of some of the highest-proﬁle internet 
disputes today. For example, Microsoft Ireland was wrongheaded for many rea-
sons—as has been discussed elsewhere
356
—but perhaps most strikingly, it was 
wrong from a comity perspective. As noted above, Apple’s amicus brief argued 
that comity concerns cautioned against the court applying ECPA extraterritori-
ally.
357
 This is almost certainly wrong, at least in this case, but probably also be-
yond it. Comity requires a concern for other states’ interests, which can be as-
serted directly or considered by the court sua sponte.
358
 But that interest is not 
necessarily inconsistent with the extraterritorial application of another state’s 
laws. To be sure, a presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction can some-
times be consistent with comity. The Supreme Court has observed that the goal 
behind the presumption against extraterritoriality is “to protect against unin-
tended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result 
in international discord.”
359
 To the extent the presumption achieves this goal, it 
 
355. See Eric Roberson, Comity Be Damned: The Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against the Courts of a 
Foreign Nation, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 409, 421-22 (1998). 
356. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Surprising Implications of the Microsoft/Ireland Warrant Case, WASH. 
POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/29/the-surprising-implications-of-the-microsoftireland 
-warrant-case [https://perma.cc/3LQ2-6ZSR]; Jennifer Granick, The Microsoft Ireland Case 
and the Future of Digital Privacy, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2016), http://www.justsecurity.org
/32076/microsoft-ireland-case-future-digital-privacy [https://perma.cc/6MQ9-UZH9]. 
357. Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft, Inc. by Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 18, 
at 10-14. 
358. Brewer v. Marshall, 119 F.3d 993, 999 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court raised 
comity sua sponte); see also Katherine A. MacFarlane, Adversarial No More: How Sua Sponte 
Assertion of Affirmative Defenses to Habeas Wreaks Havoc on the Rules of Civil Procedure, 91 OR. 
L. REV. 177, 198 (2012) (noting how courts raise arguments sua sponte out of a concern for 
comity). 
359. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing McCulloch v. Sociedad 
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20-22 (1963)). 
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is consistent with comity. Nevertheless, extraterritorial assertions of authority 
over the cloud are not, by the same token, inconsistent with comity. 
That is, the presumption against extraterritoriality—often treated as a com-
ity doctrine—is not in fact necessary for comity.
360
 As we have seen, one state’s 
internet regulations may raise many cross-border issues.
361
 Fortunately, the so-
lutions to these problems are often cross-border as well and often in ways that 
are harmless from the perspective of another state’s interests. As the Supreme 
Court said in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S.A.
362
: 
No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to foreign 
conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to 
regulate its own commercial affairs. But our courts have long held that 
application of our antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct is 
nonetheless reasonable, and hence consistent with principles of prescrip-
tive comity, insofar as they reﬂect a legislative effort to redress domestic 
antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused.
363
  
Comity requires the courts to weigh competing government interests, but it does 
not per se prohibit regulation of extraterritorial conduct. 
Indeed, it is increasingly difficult to regulate domestic conduct in ways that 
do not have extraterritorial effects. The presumption against extraterritoriality is 
falling out of favor with scholars largely for the same reasons: in a globally con-
nected world where many businesses are transnational, we can no longer assume 
that laws should not apply across borders.
364
 In this vein, Zachary Clopton noted 
that “[t]he presumption against extraterritoriality rose in an era in which terri-
toriality was more central to international law and conﬂict of laws than it is to-
day, not to mention a time in which the nature, scope, and quantity of extrater-




360. See Clopton, supra note 36, at 11-12. 
361. See supra Part I. 
362. 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
363. Id. at 165. 
364. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. 
REV. 179, 184 (“[T]he world in which a presumption against extraterritoriality made sense is 
gone.”). 
365. Clopton, supra note 36, at 10. 
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In fact, in some cases, applying one country’s laws extraterritorially may be 
precisely the best way to accommodate another sovereign’s interests.
366
 Imagine, 
for example, that two countries worked together to solve a cross-border problem 
like a botnet—a network of computers infected with a program that allows them 
to be remotely controlled.
367
 Suppose that each country has a choice between: 
(a) applying its laws territorially and ordering that providers take down websites 
that contain infected material, but only those websites with servers that operate 
on the country’s soil; or (b) applying its laws extraterritorially and aiming to 
take down the websites and their servers wherever they are located. Option (b) 
may be preferable for any state that is affected by the bot. Indeed, one could im-
agine another country weighing in to alert the court that there is no need to hes-
itate for the sake of comity and that, to the contrary, the best way to satisfy that 




B. Global Injunctions 
Another relevant issue is the issuance of “global” injunctions, like the one in 
Equustek. The primary argument against these injunctions is that they are incon-
sistent with comity.
369
 As Google noted in its complaint: “Foreign courts . . . or-
dinarily refrain from issuing worldwide injunctions because they only have ju-
risdiction to prescribe conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place 




366. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (calling comity “[t]he extent to which the law of 
one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative act, 
or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of another nation”). 
367. What Is a Botnet?, CLOUDFLARE, https://www.cloudﬂare.com/learning/ddos/what-is-a-ddos
-botnet [https://perma.cc/A9NN-844E]. This sort of cross-border cooperation is increas-
ingly common. Microsoft recently worked with law enforcement agents around the world to 
remove a botnet that had infected millions of computers. Cory Bennett, Officials Break Up 
Global Ring of 1m Infected Computers, HILL (Dec. 4, 2015, 9:15 AM EST), https://thehill.com
/policy/cybersecurity/262087-officials-break-up-global-ring-of-infected-computers 
[https://perma.cc/B48X-PRDX]. 
368. See Ralf Michaels, Empagran’s Empire: International Law and Statutory Interpretation in the U.S. 
Supreme Court of the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 533, 544 (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 2011) (“Cases from The 
Antelope through Empagran suggest that the refusal to apply law extraterritorially—especially 
regarding conduct that is almost universally condemned (slavery, price-ﬁxing)—can also be a 
problem . . . .”). 
369. Complaint, supra note 7, at 11. 
370. Id. 
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This is wrong. Comity requires weighing another country’s interests and lit-
tle more.
371
 Indeed, courts have historically issued antisuit injunctions—which 
are effectively global injunctions—preventing litigants from pursuing their 
rights in other jurisdictions.
372
 The idea behind these global injunctions is sim-
ple: courts hope to prevent duplicative lawsuits.
373
 The issuance of these injunc-
tions requires consideration of other nations’ interests. “When a preliminary in-
junction takes the form of a foreign antisuit injunction, we are required to 
balance domestic judicial interests against concerns of international comity.”
374
 
Recall the Equustek court’s global injunction, which, despite a great deal of 
consternation about its reach, did in fact explicitly embrace a limiting principle 
consistent with comity.
375
 The court noted: 
Google’s argument that a global injunction violates international comity 
because it is possible that the order could not have been obtained in a 
foreign jurisdiction, or that to comply with it would result in Google vi-
olating the laws of that jurisdiction, is theoretical. If Google has evidence 
that complying with such an injunction would require it to violate the 
laws of another jurisdiction, including interfering with freedom of ex-
pression, it is always free to apply to the British Columbia courts to vary 





371. This is especially true of injunctions. Exactly how much discretion courts have depends on 
which international comity doctrine is being invoked. Enforcement of foreign judgments in 
civil cases, for example, leaves courts with less ﬂexibility than other comity doctrines. See 
Dodge, supra note 14, at 2083 (referring to the rules of enforcement of foreign judgments as 
“nondiscretionary”). 
372. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 114 (“Occasionally, U.S. courts will do essentially 
the opposite of international abstention: they will issue a so-called anti-suit injunction to pre-
vent persons or entities subject to their personal jurisdiction from pursuing litigation in for-
eign tribunals.”). 
373. Id. 
374. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 
366 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 
F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that courts “must take account of considerations of interna-
tional comity” when evaluating whether to grant an antisuit injunction); Laker Airways Ltd. 
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the 
decision to grant or deny an antisuit injunction requires examination of the “equitable cir-
cumstances” in each case). 
375. Woods, supra note 79. 
376. Google Inc. v. Equustek Sols. Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 824, 827-28 (Can.). 
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The court invited a comity analysis, but there was no need for one, because there 
was no conﬂict of laws and indeed no conﬂict with another nation’s sovereign 
interests.
377
 Comity only requires asking whether there is a sovereign interest at 
stake and asking whether it is worth deferring to that interest.
378
 Where states 
assert an interest in the case, comity does not dictate that courts defer automati-




In the internet context, observers fear that countries might unilaterally im-
pose worldwide their vision for the internet. China, for example, could issue an 
order requiring that apps scrub any mention of Tibet wherever they operate, 
both in and out of China.
380
 However, such an action is unlikely to survive in a 
comity-based regime. First, China would need to have personal jurisdiction over 
the app provider, and a court might decline (for comity reasons) to ﬁnd that it 
has that jurisdiction.
381
 Second, a foreign court might have to decide whether it 
has the authority to enforce a global injunction. This can cut in both directions. 
We have seen that enforcement of foreign judgments is a comity doctrine,
382
 and 
the logic of comity runs in favor of recognizing foreign actors and judgments, 
 
377. A conﬂict with another nation’s laws is not the only relevant question in a comity analysis, 
but it can be dispositive. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) 
(ﬁnding that “international comity” did not call for exercising jurisdiction where no conﬂict 
of laws existed). 
378. See ULRICH HUBER, DE CONFLICTU LEGUM DIVERSARUM IN DIVERSIS IMPERIIS [OF THE CON-
FLICT OF DIVERSE LAWS IN DIVERSE GOVERNMENTS] (1689), translated in Ernest G. Lorenzen, 
Huber’s De Conﬂictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 403 (1919) (“Sovereigns will so act by way of 
comity that rights acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so 
far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its sub-
jects.”). 
379. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (2018) (holding 
that comity counsels courts to “carefully consider a foreign state’s views about the meaning of 
its own laws” but that “a federal court is neither bound to adopt the foreign government’s 
characterization nor required to ignore other relevant materials”). 
380. See, e.g., China: World Leader of Internet Censorship: Oral Statement at the 17th Session of the 
Human Rights Council, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 3, 2011, 9:30 AM EDT), https://www.hrw
.org/news/2011/06/03/china-world-leader-Internet-censorship [https://perma.cc/93PA 
-CBJ6]. 
381. See, e.g., Royal & Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92-97 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (applying international comity abstention). But see RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF 
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION § 304 reporters’ note 3 
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has never 
explicitly endorsed these doctrines). 
382. See supra Section III.B. 




 It would be an odd result for a court to decide not to recog-
nize another state’s judgment out of a concern for comity. For example, in its 
cross-border litigation over a delisting order, Google argued that comity runs 
both ways. In Canada, Google argued that comity required the country not to 
extend its ruling abroad.
384
 This argument, whatever its merits, was consistent 
with the logic of comity. States occasionally restrict the jurisdictional reach of 
their judgments in order not to offend another state’s sovereignty.
385
 Elsewhere, 
they recognize another state’s judgments, giving those judgments extraterrito-
rial effect, out of a concern for ensuring that foreign state’s sovereign interests.
386
 
But the logic of comity does not compel a court to decline to enforce a foreign 
judgment out of respect for that foreign nation’s sovereignty. Indeed, declining 
to enforce the order would have the opposite effect. 
Yet while comity calls for enforcing a foreign judgment, states can also, de-
spite comity, decline to enforce a foreign judgment because to do so would con-
travene some legitimate state interest. As the Restatement notes, American courts 
will not enforce a foreign judgment where “the cause of action on which the 
judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of 
the United States or of the State where recognition is sought.”
387
 Even if China 
passed the law forbidding apps from mentioning Tibet and attempted to enforce 
it globally, it could not succeed in enforcing that law in any country that has a 
similar public-policy exception to general comity principles. Courts in those 
countries would entertain challenges that China’s order simply interferes too 
much with laws or interests in those states. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in 
Yahoo!’s challenge to a French regulation regarding the sale of Nazi memora-
bilia, courts will not enforce foreign judgments where doing so would be funda-
mentally repugnant to the state’s public policies.
388
  The court noted that 
“[i]nconsistency with American law is not necessarily enough to prevent recog-
nition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in the United States. The foreign 




383. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 2074; see also The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1870) 
(recognizing a foreign sovereign’s privilege, based in comity, to bring lawsuits in U.S. courts). 
384. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text. 
385. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2106 (2016) (“[P]roviding a 
private civil remedy for foreign conduct creates a potential for international friction beyond 
that presented by merely applying U.S. substantive law to that foreign conduct.”). 
386. See Dodge, supra note 14, at 2078. 
387. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 482(2)(d) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
388. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1215 (9th Cir. 
2006) (en banc) (opinion of Fletcher, J.). 
389. Id. 
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Comity therefore provides two built-in protections for states worried about 
global injunctions that violate fundamental values. One state’s courts might de-
ploy comity on the front end—by limiting the reach or strength of an injunc-
tion—and another state’s courts might decline to deploy comity on the back end, 
by refusing to enforce that extraterritorial injunction if it contravenes public pol-
icy. Comity is thus not inconsistent with global injunctions. Rather, it gives 
courts tools to modulate the reach and strength of those injunctions. 
C. International Agreements 
Comity calls for mutual accommodation. Agreements between states regard-
ing their control over the internet—including agreements to cede some of this 
control—are not inconsistent with that principle.
390
 To the contrary, interna-
tional agreements are often struck in the spirit of mutual accommodation and 
may pave the way for greater clarity about, and more deference to, sovereign 
interests.
391
 This is the idea behind, for example, mutual legal assistance treaties 
by which states agree to assist each other in criminal investigations.
392
 
Efforts are underway to update the regime for cross-border law enforcement 
access to data.
393
 The United States and the United Kingdom are working to 
reach an agreement on a joint framework for law enforcement access to data 
stored abroad
394
  consistent with the framework established by the CLOUD 
Act.
395
 That agreement reﬂects a recognition of both states’ needs and is an at-
tempt to accommodate those needs.
396
 The agreement will ideally serve as a 
model for other states that will seek to strike similar agreements with the United 
States.
397
 Similarly, the Privacy Shield regime, which represents an agreement 
 
390. See, e.g., Maher M. Dabbah, Future Directions in Bilateral Cooperation: A Policy Perspective, in 
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 287, 288 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) 
(noting that comity is a dominant form of bilateral competition agreements). 
391. Id. at 288 & n.2. 
392. See Andrew Keane Woods, Mutual Legal Assistance in the Digital Age, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 659 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017). 
393. See David Kris, U.S. Government Presents Draft Legislation for Cross-Border Data Requests, LAW-
FARE (July 16, 2016, 8:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-government-presents 
-draft-legislation-cross-border-data-requests [https://perma.cc/9BBF-SVNE]. 
394. Id. 
395. 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018). 
396. Draft Legislation to Permit the Secure and Privacy-Protective Exchange of Electronic Data for 
the Purposes of Combating Serious Crime Including Terrorism (on ﬁle with author). 
397. See Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177, at 13-14 (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Department of Justice). 
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between the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Swiss Administration, and the 
European Commission, might also serve as a model.
398
 
We might imagine reaching a similar set of agreements on other issues as 
well, from intellectual property rights to speech and privacy protections. When 
the European Court hears arguments challenging the Privacy Shield regime,
399
 
it should not take seriously arguments that the regime does not sufficiently re-
spect sovereign interests (including sovereign privacy protections). The agree-
ment was struck between sovereigns, and nothing in the sovereign-deference 
doctrines suggests that states cannot bind themselves in agreement to accom-
modate intersovereign concerns. 
v. courts and beyond 
Where does this leave us? If, as this Article has argued,
400
 we should have a 
general preference for sovereign deference, then the sovereign-deference doc-
trines are welcome tools. These doctrines are a useful guide for courts in the data 
sovereignty cases, and they may even offer more generalizable principles for de-
termining how far each state’s sovereign authority ought to extend over the in-
ternet and how much room other states ought to allow for that authority. They 
may even offer guidelines for other actors, beyond courts. This Part brieﬂy ad-
dresses the question of courts’ competence to manage data sovereignty disputes 
before asking what a policy of sovereign deference might mean for other actors. 
Whether one agrees with the criticisms of court-managed foreign affairs or 
not,
401
 courts will be the ones to resolve these disputes unless steps are taken by 
the executive, by Congress, and by American internet ﬁrms themselves, preemp-
tively, to defer to sovereign interests. 
 
398. Welcome to the Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.privacyshield.gov
/welcome [https://perma.cc/2YA7-VTLQ]. 
399. See, e.g., Case T-670/16, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Comm’n (Nov. 22, 2017), http://curia.europa
.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=197141&pageIndex=0&doclang=en 
[https://perma.cc/BZ2G-R7VD]. 
400. See supra Part II. 
401. Dodge responds to both arguments. For the counterargument to the view that comity is an 
expansive doctrine with no limiting principles, see Dodge, supra note 14, at 2125-32. For the 
counterargument to the view that the executive branch ought to have dominion in making 
comity determinations, see id. at 2132-40. 
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A. The Question of Competence 
As the last Part shows, the foreign affairs doctrines will not keep courts out 
of the business of resolving cross-border disputes. If globalization makes it dif-
ﬁcult for courts to resolve disputes without producing some foreign relations ef-
fect,
402
 then the data-sovereignty cases suggest that the internet accelerates that 
trend. This could serve to normalize foreign relations law even further.
403
 It also 
suggests that courts will play a key role in deciding major questions of technol-
ogy policy. Is this cause for concern? One of the dominant themes in the foreign 
affairs literature is the question of courts’ institutional capacity to manage for-
eign relations.
404
 The Constitution allocates foreign affairs responsibilities to the 
President; accordingly, some think, courts ought to attempt to stay out of foreign 
affairs.
405
 Yet it is worth considering whether the data-sovereignty cases could 
change settled preferences for political-branch management of foreign affairs. 
On the one hand, we might imagine that courts are less well suited to manage 
sovereign deference in the context of fast-changing technological disputes. If a 
court makes certain assumptions about the technological feasibility of one rem-
edy or another, and those assumptions turn out to be wrong, then the court may 
apply foreign affairs norms in unfortunate ways. For example, a court could con-
clude that geo-blocking technology—the kind of technology that allows a ﬁrm 
to know where its users are located—is insufficiently accurate to capture territo-
rial interests and therefore decide against a location-based remedy. What if this 
assumption later turns out to be wrong as geo-blocking technology advances? 
(Indeed, in its dispute with the CNIL at the European Court of Justice, Google 
was quick to point out that its geo-blocking technology is now good enough to 
identify the geographic location of 99.94% of users.
406
) The same concern might 
arise as technology develops with respect to locating users, identifying illegal 
content for takedowns, and so on. Another argument against courts’ competency 
in this area is that they manage individual cases or controversies and, therefore, 
cannot link issues. Productive compromises may be possible by linking issues if 
parties compromise on one issue to achieve their goals on another. The literature 
 
402. See Clopton, supra note 36, at 11-13. 
403. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 34, at 1919-35. 
404. See sources cited supra notes 35-36. 
405. See, e.g., BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 119-32; Robert M. Chesney, National Secu-
rity Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009). 
406. Mark Scott (@markscott82), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2018, 1:53 AM), https://twitter.com 
/markscott82/status/1039436684562231296 [https://perma.cc/XG3N-P88F]. 
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on issue linkage suggests that this is precisely one beneﬁt of bundling issues,
407
 
which courts cannot do as well as legislatures, because they hear one dispute at 
a time. 
We might also wonder if arguments about courts’ competence in crafting 
technology policy might apply here. Orin Kerr, for example, suggests that the 
“legislative branch rather than the judiciary should create the primary investiga-
tive rules when technology is changing.”
408
 The problems, as Kerr sees them, are 
that “it is difficult for judges to fashion lasting guidance when technologies are 
new and rapidly changing,” that “[c]ourts lack the institutional capacity to easily 
grasp the privacy implications of new technologies they encounter,” and that ju-
dicially created rules “cannot change quickly” and therefore “tend to become 
quickly outdated or uncertain as technology changes.”
409
 Legislatures, by con-
trast, “usually act at a surprisingly early stage, and certainly long before the 
courts.”
410
 As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, courts are simply “institution-
ally ill-equipped” to handle fast-changing technologies, and therefore, courts 
ought to defer to legislatures that can act quickly and adapt rules to new facts.
411
 
This view has been endorsed by several Supreme Court Justices.
412
 But is it 
right—either in general or in the context of cross-border data disputes? Arguably 
not.
413
 If the goal is ﬂexibility, then one might simply prefer standards over 
bright-line rules. But courts can fashion ﬂexible standards without the aid of 
legislative intervention, and they do so all the time, especially when the facts on 
the ground are fast-changing.
414
 Kerr suggests that his argument carries special 
 
407. See, e.g., John S. Odell & Dustin Tingley, Negotiating Agreements in International Relations, in 
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON NEGOTIATING AGREE-
MENT IN POLITICS 144, 161-62 (Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013). 
408. Kerr, supra note 29, at 806. 
409. Id. at 858-59. 
410. Id. at 870. 
411. United States v. McNulty (In re Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 105-06 (4th Cir. 1995). 
412. See Sklansky, supra note 29, at 226 (“The idea that new technological threats to privacy are 
best addressed by legislatures rather than by courts recently picked up four new endorse-
ments, from Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Elena Ka-
gan.”). 
413. For two responses to Kerr’s institutional-competence argument, see Sklansky, supra note 29, 
at 224-33; and Solove, supra note 29, at 761-77. 
414. Standards have long been celebrated for their ability to adapt to an uncertain future: 
What the author of a legal document is trying to control is the future itself . . . . You 
are trying to stabilize a part of the future, set it on a course, make it more foreseeable 
and more reliable . . . . But what happens in the future is necessarily uncertain, in-
choate, contingent, only partly foreseeable, and you must therefore ﬁnd some sim-
ilar and corresponding quality in the words you are using. Brieﬂy, your words 
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weight in the context of the Fourth Amendment.
415
 But if the argument for ju-
dicial deference to other branches has special weight anywhere, then surely it is 
the data-sovereignty litigation where concerns about court competence to en-
gage in foreign affairs accrue alongside concerns about the fast pace of techno-
logical change. 
Kerr also suggests that his argument only applies where the technology is 
fast-changing.
416
 But when is technology not in ﬂux? Indeed, technology today 
is both fast-changing and far-reaching. If we think that courts should step back 
when technology is changing quickly, should we also think that courts can no 
longer fairly resolve disputes involving the ﬁnancial sector, healthcare, or any 
other industry that is being transformed by technological change? 
Courts have much to recommend them as policymakers. The fact that courts 
only hear cases based on the facts before them may make them precisely the right 
actors for regulating in such a fast-changing area.
417
 Rather than implementing 
sweeping changes across a number of issues—changes that might be hard to roll 
back later—courts regulate case by case, allowing for incremental policy devel-
opment, which might be preferable given the current pace of technological 
change. This may be especially true in the foreign affairs context, where courts 




Courts can also invite further action by resolving individual cases while leav-
ing the door open to the political branches to revise the law more broadly as it 
develops. As Erin Murphy writes, courts act when the legislature does not, and 
this fear of judicial uncertainty can be a powerful motivator for legislative ac-
tion.
419
 Better policy may emerge where courts and the other branches engage in 
a back-and-forth over how technology might apply in different contexts and in 
ways that are consistent with constitutional norms.
420
 Murphy wrote speciﬁcally 
about applying privacy rules in criminal law to fast-changing technologies. But 
compelling evidence also supports her argument in the data-sovereignty cases. 
 
should be as ﬂexible, as elastic, indeed as vague, as the future is uncertain and un-
predictable. 
Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407, 423-24 (1950), as 
quoted in Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 399 n.59 (1985). 
415. Kerr, supra note 29, at 882 (distinguishing the “uniqueness of criminal procedure”). 
416. Id. at 859. 
417. Kerr acknowledges this point explicitly but suggests that criminal law is particularly ill-suited 
to case-by-case rulemaking when technology is in ﬂux. Id. at 883. 
418. William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1963). 
419. See Murphy, supra note 29, at 498. 
420. Id. 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
398 
The problem of jurisdictional hurdles to cross-border law enforcement data 
requests has been around for as long as there have been cross-border law en-
forcement data requests.
421







—Congress sat still. Indeed, the Office 
of International Affairs in the Department of Justice, which manages cross-bor-
der requests for data, went to Congress repeatedly to ask for more funding, and 
Congress did little. Congress showed very little interest in addressing this issue 
until the Microsoft Ireland litigation. After the case began, congressional staffers 
began to entertain the idea of holding hearings, and in 2016, when it was clear 
that the case was bound for the Supreme Court, the House Judiciary Committee 
held a hearing on the matter.
425
 In 2017, after the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees both held hearings.
426
 Only 
after the case had been argued at the Court—and after considerable lobbying on 
the Hill by both parties to the lawsuit—did Congress pass the CLOUD Act to 
resolve the issues raised by the case.
427
 
As a result, it appears, in at least in one signiﬁcant case, that Congress was 
unwilling to address the jurisdictional barriers to cross-border law enforcement 
until the judiciary acted. This is Murphy’s “interbranch dialogue”
428
 in action. Is 
 
421. Woods, supra note 15, at 750 (showing requests going back to 2000); see also Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 17 (“This is not a new problem.”). 
422. Brad Smith, Time for an International Convention on Government Access to Data, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 22, 2014, 9:38 AM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-smith/time-for-an
-international-convention-on-government-access-to-data_b_4644130.html [https://perma
.cc/KK2W-DWHK]. 
423. Letter to US Congress Urging Increase to MLAT Funding, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 
18, 2014), https://cdt.org/insight/letter-to-us-congress-urging-increase-to-mlat-funding 
[https://perma.cc/3M5Z-PZ2G]. 
424. Andrew K. Woods, Why Does Microsoft Want a Global Convention on Government Access to 
Data?, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/7246/microsoft-global 
-convention-government-access-data [https://perma.cc/KS8U-X8ZU]. 
425. International Conﬂicts of Law and Their Implications for Cross Border Data Requests by Law En-
forcement: Hearing before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2016). 
426. Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177; Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facil-
itating Cooperation and Protecting Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017). 
427. Indeed, the interbranch dialogue was so intense that one of the sponsors of the CLOUD Act, 
Senator Orrin Hatch, attended oral argument, and the Court seemed genuinely confused 
about whether it would need to rule at all. See Andrew Keane Woods, Analysis of Microsoft-
Ireland Supreme Court Oral Argument, LAWFARE (Feb. 27, 2018, 6:39 PM), https://www 
.lawfareblog.com/analysis-microsoft-ireland-supreme-court-oral-argument [https://perma
.cc/9AB9-5FUH]. 
428. Murphy, supra note 29, at 538. 
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it optimal? That much is unclear. The Court might have interpreted the search 
as not occurring in Ireland, as many lower courts did in related cases, thereby 
sidestepping the issue.
429
 This would have been a clean resolution to the prob-
lem, and it would have avoided some of the problems that the CLOUD Act cre-
ates.
430
 But who knows how the Court would have ruled, and that uncertainty is 
one reason we might prefer legislative rulemaking—whether prompted by im-
minent judicial action or not—over court-made policy. 
Should we prefer courts to avoid hearing data-sovereignty cases? It may not 
matter. A cadre of scholars has argued that judicial isolationism is indefensible 
today.
431
 The message these globalist scholars have for courts is that they simply 
cannot escape foreign affairs in a globalized world. Adapting this argument to 
the data-sovereignty litigation and building on Murphy and Kerr, we can con-
clude that courts cannot escape technology policy in a digitized world. Ulti-
mately, it may not matter whether courts are the optimal actors to address these 
conﬂicts if they end up being, by default, the primary ones to do so. 
B. Sovereign Deference by the Legislature 
The biggest barrier to law enforcement access to evidence in the world today 
is an American law: ECPA.
432
 Rather than completely repeal ECPA’s onerous 
blocking features, which create tensions around the world, Congress passed the 
CLOUD Act, which grants the executive branch the authority to allow certain 
countries into the “club”—meaning that those countries’ governments are able 




The CLOUD Act has some limited but important features of sovereign def-
erence built in. The Act explicitly states that providers may, upon receipt of a 
request to disclose the contents of a customer’s account, 
ﬁle a motion to modify or quash the legal process where the provider 
reasonably believes: 
 
429. See supra note 99. 
430. See Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177, at 6 (statement of Andrew Keane Woods, Assistant 
Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law). 
431. See supra note 34. 
432. See Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177, at 6-7 (statement of Andrew Keane Woods, Assistant 
Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law). 
433. See id. at 7. 
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(i) that the customer or subscriber is not a United States person and 
does not reside in the United States; and 
(ii) that the required disclosure would create a material risk that the 




Moreover, in weighing these motions to quash, courts are explicitly instructed 
to engage in a comity analysis.
435
 Courts are told to take into account, where 
appropriate, “the interests of the United States” in having the data produced, the 
interests of “the qualifying foreign government” in keeping the data from being 
produced, the likelihood and extent of penalties the provider might suffer from 
disclosure, the location and nationality of the subscriber and their connection to 
the United States, and more.
436
 
While this legislative framework has the trappings of sovereign deference—
comity, balancing national interests, and so on—it actually appears to narrow 
considerably the inﬂuence that comity and related doctrines will have over these 
cases. Before the CLOUD Act, courts were free to conduct a comity analysis sua 
sponte and decline to enforce an order if it would infringe on another state’s 
sovereignty.
437
 Indeed, some had hoped that the Supreme Court might do just 
that in Microsoft Ireland.
438
 Instead, a court might now reasonably conclude that 
its authority to weigh sovereign interests is only permitted under the speciﬁc cir-
cumstances spelled out by the Act. If Congress wanted comity to play a role in 
cross-border data cases, it might just as well have left these comity-limiting pa-
rameters out of the bill. 
In other, more signiﬁcant respects, the bill is a step backwards from the kind 
of sovereign deference that will be necessary for a lasting and interoperable in-
ternet. U.S. law now gives countries a choice: (1) behave well, comply with the 
due process standards set by the Americans, and ask nicely, and the United States 
might allow you to enforce your laws on your soil, or (2) take whatever steps are 
needed to enforce your laws on your soil. The creation of a club of insider coun-
 
434. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2)(A) (2018). 
435. Id. § 2703(h)(3). 
436. Id. 
437. Andrew Keane Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix for Cross-
Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:49 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloud
-act-welcome-legislative-ﬁx-cross-border-data-problems [https://perma.cc/4MJ4-EC8C] 
(noting that comity was available to courts before the CLOUD Act passed). 
438. Brief in Support of Appellant Microsoft, Inc. by Apple Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 18, 
at 10-14. 
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tries could ideally create a race to the top where countries seek to strengthen pro-
tections for human rights and privacy in order to be eligible for an agreement 
with the United States under the CLOUD Act. This is possible. But clubs lead to 
anticlubs
439
—and China is actively pursuing just such a club.
440
 
Countries with attractive markets like India face a choice. They can comply 
with the United States’ prerequisites and ask for admittance to the club—a nec-
essary step if India is going to be able to enforce its laws on its soil without taking 
physical control over the Indian internet architecture—or they can take legisla-
tive steps to force compliance with Indian laws and hope that the country’s mar-
ket is lucrative enough to leave foreign ﬁrms little choice but to comply. A few 
months after the CLOUD Act passed, India’s Justice BN Srikrishna Commit-
tee—a committee tasked by the government with creating a national privacy re-
gime—released a comprehensive report and a draft data protection law, the “Per-
sonal Data Protection Bill, 2018.”
441
  The bill requires that data collected on 
Indians in India be stored on servers located in India. In short, the bill mandates 
data localization. In response, policy advocates have suggested that the govern-
ment pursue a bilateral agreement of the sort envisioned by the CLOUD Act as 
an alternative to data localization.
442
 It remains to be seen which view wins out, 
but it is clear that the CLOUD Act frames the choice in stark relief. 
All of this could have been avoided with a simple reform to ECPA that clari-
ﬁed that ECPA did not apply to law enforcement requests made outside the 
United States and that U.S. companies are therefore free as a matter of U.S. law 
to comply with those requests.
443
 Whether U.S. ﬁrms decide to comply with 
those orders is another matter, but they should at least have the choice that ﬁrms 
have in nearly every other industry: comply with local rules or exit the market. 
American law should not stand as a barrier to Indian or Brazilian law enforce-
ment efforts (or American ﬁrms’ efforts at compliance with those laws). 
 
439. See Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177, at 7-8 (statement of Andrew Keane Woods, Assistant 
Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law). 
440. See Eichensehr, supra note 28, at 319-20. 
441. The Personal Data Protection Bill 2018, MINISTRY ELECTRONICS & INFO. TECH., https://meity
.gov.in/writereaddata/ﬁles/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill%2C2018_0.pdf [https://perma
.cc/AV3B-ZKVS]. 
442. Bedavyasa Mohanty & Madhulika Srikumar, Data Localization Is No Solution, OBSERVER RES. 
FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.orfonline.org/research/42990-data-localisation-is-no 
-solution [https://perma.cc/LH49-9PER]. 
443. See Data Stored Abroad, supra note 177, at 7 (statement of Andrew Keane Woods, Assistant 
Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law). 
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Cross-border law enforcement requests are unlikely to be the last chance 
Congress has to reveal itself as mindful of other sovereign interests over the in-
ternet. But there are reasons to worry that Congress will not recognize those in-
terests. In the past decade alone, Congress has held nine hearings on so-called 
Internet Freedom bills, which are designed explicitly to frustrate China’s efforts 
at controlling the internet within its territory.
444
 
C. Sovereign Deference by the Executive 
There are a number of steps that the executive could take to recognize foreign 
nations’ legitimate sovereign interests over the internet. This is true even setting 
aside the fraught efforts to develop international norms regarding 
cyberwarfare.
445
 The Presidential Policy Directive that grants some foreigners 
the same rights as American citizens is a prime example, as was the U.S.-U.K. 
agreement regarding law enforcement access to data. Yet both of these executive 
measures could go considerably further to defer to sovereign interests. 
Trust in American internet companies and in the American intelligence com-
munity plummeted in the wake of the Snowden revelations.
446
 This precipitated 
a much more aggressive stance by many American ﬁrms towards the U.S. gov-
ernment.
447
 There were many other consequences of this loss of trust, including 
the Schrems decision that invalidated the safe harbor arrangement.
448
  In re-
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sponse, the United States immediately set about to repair its bond with the Eu-
ropean Union.
449
 President Obama gave a remarkable speech announcing PPD-
28, where he declared: “[P]eople around the world—regardless of their nation-
ality—should know that the United States is not spying on ordinary people who 
don’t threaten our national security, and that we take their privacy concerns into 
account.”
450
 Yet PPD-28 is a slippery document, “one that conveys and writes 
into policy a great deal of values without constraining a great deal of practice.”
451
 
PPD-28 is an excellent example of executive branch sovereign deference, and 
it could be applied to other areas beyond surveillance. The President could de-
velop an entire policy framework, in the vein of PPD-28, which assures foreign 
partners that the United States recognizes foreign sovereign interests across a 
range of internet-governance issues and that it will not stand in their way. This 
might take the form of the executive branch working with Congress to take leg-
islative action, like it did when it worked with Congress to craft and pass the 
CLOUD Act.
452
 It could include a foreign-sovereign litigation policy by which 
the United States will not oppose and might even work with foreign sovereigns 
litigating one of the issues described here. Finally, it likely would mean reversing 
course on the Internet Freedom program at the State Department,
453
 which has 
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received considerable funding—$145 million since 2008
454
 —and which many 
states see as a threat to their sovereign authority.
455
 
International agreements are another avenue for recognizing sovereign in-
terests.
456
 For example, rather than allowing the European Court of Justice to 
decide, by its own jurisdictional analysis, whether Google must comply globally 
with the right to be forgotten, U.S. and European leaders could attempt to ne-
gotiate a solution. Lest this sound naive, it is worth noting that in the law en-
forcement context, we already have a model for such an agreement. The draft 
agreement struck between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding 
access to cross-border data for terrorism and serious crime is a good start because 
it openly acknowledges that each state has a legitimate interest in accessing data 
held in the other’s territory.
457
 But the agreement, which is planned as a model 
for future agreements, is to be implemented by legislation that requires potential 
parties to later agreements to be certiﬁed by the Attorney General as meeting 
certain human-rights standards, which are set at a high level.
458
 This risks cre-




D. Sovereign Deference by Internet Firms 
Finally, companies could elect to be more deferential to state interests than 
they currently are. This is not an argument for company capitulation to every 
state demand. But, as this Article has suggested, it is a dangerous game to frus-
trate state interests at every turn. Indeed, it is precisely the sort of antisovereign 
actions taken by major technology ﬁrms that have sparked the harshest criticism 
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of those ﬁrms. Scholars have likened these ﬁrms to railroads
460
 and public utili-
ties.
461
 Both of these examples suggest that some scholars feel the need for break-
their-back regulation and submission to the state. With this same dynamic play-
ing out in other countries, it may make sense for technology ﬁrms to tread lightly 
with states. 
When should an intermediary resist the state? This is a complex question 
with no easy answer, but over the long run, we can see that resisting state rules 
while taking advantage of the state’s market is likely to be unsuccessful for the 
company and, worse, is likely to produce harmful consequences for internet us-
ers. In the short run, individual ﬁrms have an incentive to operate under a single 
set of rules globally, without tailoring their services to different state rules. But 
over time, as states bear down on ﬁrms to comply with local rules, states may 
take extreme self-help measures when ﬁrms resist—making everyone worse off. 
Not all states can force a company to comply with their wishes, of course; 
just those with a big enough market to warrant the ﬁrm’s attention. Smaller 
markets and weaker states may have less power to compel a ﬁrm to submit to 
local rules. Larger markets, however, are another story. Google famously left 
China in protest over the People’s Republic’s censorship practices, only to de-
velop later a censorship tool designed explicitly to place the ﬁrm in a position to 
reenter the Chinese market.
462
 Firms can protest or ignore sovereign differences 
for a time but apparently not forever. 
conclusion 
The cosmopolitan ideal for the internet—whether the product of naivete, 
utopian dreams, or strategic interest—is dead. States, being jealous of their sov-
ereignty, and users, wanting to make the digital world their own, will inevitably 
resist the idea of a single, shared online experience. What is appropriate in New 
York may not be appropriate in Bangkok and vice versa. This trend is only likely 
to continue as the physical and digital worlds merge: the more the internet be-
comes embedded in our everyday lives and the more it is constituted by data that 
reﬂect our real-world experiences, the more likely it is that the internet will need 
to reﬂect the very real differences in those experiences. 
 
460. See Rozenshtein, supra note 28, at 144. 
461. See Peter Swire, Should the Leading Online Tech Companies Be Regulated as Public Utilities?, 
LAWFARE (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-leading-online 
-tech-companies-be-regulated-public-utilities [https://perma.cc/P548-3A9Z] (“[T]here are 
some reasonably strong arguments that the biggest online services today are similar to tradi-
tional public utilities due to their high market share, network effects, and difficulty for con-
sumers to live without the service.”). 
462. Gallagher, supra note 211. 
the yale law journal 128:328  2018 
406 
This means that the internet governance question of the day is not whether 
the internet should be more or less cosmopolitan, a global internet or splinternet. 
(Indeed, the more that policymakers push for cosmopolitanism, the more they 
accelerate trends in the other direction.) Rather, the key question is how the in-
ternet will bend to accommodate sovereign differences. Do we want an internet 
that reﬂects sovereign differences in sensible, mutually agreeable ways—with 
providers and users left to decide how to comply with local laws—or do we want 
an internet where states can only achieve their aims by taking physical control of 
the network architecture? 
If we prefer the former, as we should, then we must defer to sovereign dif-
ferences in ways that encourage the development of a global internet we can all 
use. Rather than invent new forms of deference, courts especially, but also other 
actors, should look to the foreign affairs doctrines as a ready-made set of guide-
lines—doctrines of recognition and deference, as well as doctrines of abstention 
and restraint. This, in turn, will entail occasional extraterritorial exercises of au-
thority, contrary to what a number of courts and litigants in high-proﬁle internet 
disputes have argued. A familiarity with foreign affairs case law suggests that 
this is both normal and even welcome. 
 
